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PAY FOR BANKER PERFORMANCE: 
STRUCTURING EXECUTIVE  
COMPENSATION  
FOR RISK REGULATION 
Forthcoming, 105 Nw. U. L. REV __ (2010) 
Frederick Tung* 
 
Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate 
with the Financial Crisis of 2007-08.  Though bankers had spe-
cial incentives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, 
the incentive effects of equity-based compensation have been un-
derstood for some time.  Among other things, equity compensa-
tion tends to induce greater risk taking by aligning managers’ 
risk preferences with those of equity holders.  Longstanding gov-
ernment guaranties of bank liabilities additionally served to in-
tensify bankers’ risk taking incentives.  
 I propose to ameliorate this gambler’s incentive with a new 
approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explic-
itly accounts for the possibility of excessive risk taking and in-
centivizes bankers against it.  I propose that bankers be paid in 
part with their banks’ public subordinated debt securities.  Mar-
ket pricing of this debt will be particularly sensitive to downside 
risk at the bank.  Including it in bankers’ pay arrangements and 
personal portfolios will therefore give bankers direct personal 
incentives to avoid excessive risk.  Moreover, recent theoretical 
and empirical research suggests that as CEOs’ holdings of their 
firms’ debt increases, firm risk taking declines. 
My approach has important advantages over recent banker 
pay reform proposals.  The largest banks are owned and oper-
ated as wholly-owned subsidiaries of bank holding companies 
(BHCs), which also typically own other financial institutions.  
                                                 
* Howard Zhang Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of 
Law, fredtung@bu.edu.  For helpful comments, I am grateful to Sanjai Bhagat, Jesse Fried, Michael 
Kang, John Mittelbach, Alon Raviv, Holger Spamann, and Chuck Whitehead, as well as workshop 
participants at the Canadian Law and Economics 2009 Annual Meeting, the Southeastern Associa-
tion of Law Schools 2009 Annual Meeting, and the Boston University School of Law.  
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Two proposals—one by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, 
and another by Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano—would 
compensate bankers with BHC securities.  But because BHCs 
own other institutions besides the given banking subsidiary, 
BHC securities can offer bankers only noisy and indirect incen-
tives with respect to risk taking at the bank.  My approach over-
comes this problem by paying bankers with debt securities issued 
by the bank itself, a course unavailable with these other propos-
als.  Debt securities of the bank will be much more sensitive to 
downside risk at the bank than the BHC equity and other securi-
ties that are the focus of these other proposals. 
In addition, my proposal offers sufficient flexibility to enable 
the tailoring of banker pay to account for bankers’ existing port-
folios of their firms’ securities and other claims on their firms. 
Because these portfolios typically dwarf bankers’ annual pay, 
they exert much stronger influence on banker risk taking than 
does annual pay.  Compensation should therefore be structured 
primarily with these portfolio incentives in mind.  My approach 
facilitates the tailoring of annual pay to achieve desirable port-
folio incentives for bankers in a way that existing proposals can-
not. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-08.  Though bankers had special in-
centives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, the incen-
tive effects of equity-based compensation have been understood 
for some time.  As Jensen and Meckling explained over three dec-
ades ago, in the presence of outside creditors, equity incentives 
may cause managers to go overboard, taking inefficient risks at the 
expense of creditors and others.  For bankers, those incentives 
were writ large with the Financial Crisis, intensified as they were 
by the moral hazard that accompanies government guaranties of 
bank deposits.  I propose to ameliorate this gamblers’ incentive 
with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that 
explicitly accounts for the possibility of excessive risk taking and 
incentivizes bankers against it.  I propose that bankers be paid in 
part with their banks’ public subordinated debt securities.  
 Constraining bank risk taking is an unending task for bank 
regulators, even outside the crisis context, because of certain spe-
cial features of banks.  Banks are highly leveraged—that is, they 
operate predominantly on borrowed money.  Bank executives also 
typically enjoy high levels of equity-based incentive pay.  These 
two factors would encourage risky strategies in any firm, because 
managers’ equity stakes enjoy an unlimited upside return if a risky 
investment succeeds, but any losses are borne primarily by credi-
tors when a risky investment fails.  Creditors of ordinary (non-
banking) firms understand these incentives, so they typically nego-
tiate contractual constraints on their borrower firms’ risk taking.  
But banks are different:  a significant group of creditors—insured 
depositors—does not monitor banks’ risk taking.  Because deposits 
are insured by the government, bank depositors are indifferent as 
to their banks’ risk taking.1  Regulators are therefore left with the 
task of constraining risk taking at banks.  And regulation is imper-
fect. 
 Policy analysts have decried the role of bank executive com-
pensation in promoting excessive risk taking leading up to the Fi-
                                                 
1 As the discussion implies, my focus is on commercial banks—deposit taking institutions—
and not investment banks or other types of “non-bank” financial institutions. 
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nancial Crisis,2 and regulators have imposed constraints on banker 
pay.3  Academics have likewise proposed banker pay reforms.4  
Two important proposals have recently emerged—one by Lucian 
Bebchuk and Holger Spamann,5 and another by Sanjai Bhagat and 
Roberta Romano.6 
 Bebchuk and Spamann propose to pay bankers with a represen-
tative slice of all their firm’s securities—preferred stock and 
bonds, as well as common equity.  This enterprise value approach 
would hopefully reduce risk taking, since preferred stockholders 
and bondholders generally prefer less risk than common share-
holders. Bhagat and Romano propose long-term equity pay for 
bankers.  Bankers would be paid with stock they could not sell un-
til several years after they retired from their firms, on the theory 
that this lengthy holding period would induce bankers to adopt a 
long-term perspective in their decisionmaking. 
 In this Essay, I introduce a new approach to banker pay that 
offers important advantages over the Bebchuk-Spamann and Bha-
gat-Romano approaches.  I propose that in addition to equity, bank 
executives should receive some portion of their compensation in 
the form of their bank’s publicly traded subordinated debt securi-
ties.7  Recent theoretical and empirical research shows that as a 
CEO’s holdings of her firm’s debt increase relative to the value of 
her equity holdings—that is, as her inside debt-equity ratio in-
creases—the firm’s risk taking declines.8  Such inside debt hold-
ings help to align managers’ interests with those of their firms’ 
                                                 
 2  Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives 
and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial instability. The Fed-
eral Reserve is working to ensure that compensation packages appropriately tie rewards 
to longer-term performance and do not create undue risk for the firm or the financial sys-
tem. 
Federal Reserve Press Release, October 22, 2009 (quoting Federal Reserve Chair Ben S. Bernanke). 
3 See infra Part III.D. 
4 See infra Part V.A, B.  A few scholars express some doubt as to the significance of bankers’ 
compensation structures as a factor in precipitating the Financial Crisis. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & 
René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, Fisher College of Business Working 
Paper Series, July 2009, available at: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859; Testimony of Kevin 
Murphy, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Hearing on 
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk, June 11, 2009, at 4-6. 
5 See infra V.B. 
6 See infra Part V.A. 
7 The largest banks typically have one or more issues of public debt outstanding.  See infra Part 
IV.B. 
8 See infra Part IV.A.  The inside debt in these studies, including ours, is in the form of pension 
and deferred compensation obligations of the firm to the CEO.   
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creditors, who are more risk averse than equity holders.  In a very 
recent paper, I and a co-author empirically test for this effect of 
inside debt in the specific context of the Financial Crisis.  We offer 
important evidence that higher pre-Crisis inside debt-equity ratios 
for bankers correlate with lower firm risk and better firm perform-
ance during the Crisis.9 Paying bankers with debt may therefore 
curb bankers’ appetite for risk, consistent with regulators’ goal of 
assuring bank safety and soundness.   
 Publicly traded subordinated bank debt may an ideal form of 
debt compensation for bankers because market pricing of this debt 
will offer a continuing referendum on risk taking at the bank.  If 
the bank were to fail, its subordinated debt would be repaid only 
after all depositors and general creditors were paid in full.  And 
subordinated debt does not enjoy the unlimited upside from the 
bank’s risky bets that equity does, since subordinated debt claims 
are fixed.  Market pricing of the debt will therefore be particularly 
sensitive to downside risk, much more so than equity.  These risk-
related price fluctuations will directly affect bankers’ wealth, giv-
ing bankers useful feedback and important incentives with respect 
to excessive risk taking. 
 For incentive purposes, the form of compensation is key, as 
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy proclaimed in the title of their 
famous Harvard Business Review article, It’s Not How Much You 
Pay, But How.10  My proposal offers two important advantages 
over existing proposals.  First, it offers a more direct and reliable 
inducement for bankers to curb excessive risk taking.  The largest 
banks are owned and operated as wholly owned subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies (BHCs), which also typically own other 
financial institutions.  The Bebchuk-Spamann and Bhagat-Romano 
proposals would compensate bankers with holding company secu-
rities: long-term equity for Bhagat and Romano, and BHC com-
mon and preferred stock and bonds, for Bebchuk and Spamann.  
But because BHCs own other institutions besides the given bank-
ing subsidiary, market pricing of BHC securities can offer bankers 
                                                 
9 Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Financial Cri-
sis 17, Emory University Working Paper (March 13, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161 (comparing a sample of commercial bank CEO holdings with Wei 
and Yermack’s (2010) sample of non-financial firm CEOs). 
10 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But 
How, HARV. BUS. REV. May-June 1990. 
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only noisy and indirect incentives with respect to risk taking at the 
bank.  Market discipline works best if the bank itself issues the se-
curities, as opposed to the bank holding company of which it is a 
subsidiary.  My approach is the first to explicitly overcome this 
problem by paying bankers with debt securities issued by the bank 
itself.11 
 In addition, my approach facilitates the tailoring of annual pay 
to achieve desirable portfolio incentives for bankers in a way that 
existing proposals cannot.  The primary focus for structuring 
banker pay should be on managing bankers’ personal portfolios of 
their firms’ securities and other claims on their firms.12  These 
portfolios typically dwarf bankers’ annual pay and so exert much 
stronger influence on bankers’ risk taking than does annual pay.  
Compensation should be structured primarily with these portfolio 
incentives in mind, and for that, my proposal is superior.13  The 
Bebchuk-Spamann “by-the-slice” approach does not directly re-
spond to the problem of excessive risk.  Because bankers’ existing 
portfolios matter, and because the composition of their portfolios 
will vary, countering a banker’s tendency toward excessive risk 
requires something more tailored than simple by-the-BHC-slice 
compensation.  Similarly, Bhagat and Romano’s long-term BHC 
equity approach does nothing to address existing portfolio ef-
fects.14   
 Requiring bankers to hold their own banks’ debt would not 
substitute for traditional external regulation but would offer an im-
                                                 
11 Given the bank holding company structure and variation of management structures within 
BHCs, identification of the specific bank executives to be targeted for pay regulation may not be a 
straightforward task.  The CEO and other top officers of a banking subsidiary should clearly be 
covered by my proposed pay constraints.  Holding company officers may need to be covered as well.  
Holding company officers will typically have significant influence over policy decisions at banking 
subsidiaries, and may even be officers of the banking subsidiaries.  For example, Ken Lewis, the 
CEO, Chairman and President of Bank of America Corporation, serves in these same capacities for 
Bank of America, N.A., its principal banking subsidiary.  Bank of America Corporation 2009 Proxy 
Statement at 16.  When BHC officers wield important influence over a banking subsidiary’s policy 
decisions, they should be made to hold subordinated debt of that bank.  See infra Part IV.D. 
12 The most important of these other claims are pension and deferred compensation claims, 
which exert a debt-like influence on managers.  See infra Part IV.A. 
13 As with all executive pay proposals, hedging against the risks imposed by the pay structure 
would be strictly forbidden.  Otherwise, the intended incentive structure would be frustrated. 
14 Moreover, their long-term BHC equity approach cannot offer the strong incentives that bank 
sub-debt provides.  In addition to the noisy proxy problem described above, long-term equity would 
offer only a weak incentive for bankers because of the long delay in realizing their rewards for good 
performance.  This is exacerbated by the “control gap” they are forced to endure:  during the period 
after retirement but before they can cash out their shares, they will have no influence over the firm’s 
performance.  Someone else will be in control.  See infra Part V.A. 
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portant supplement to the existing regulatory toolkit for constrain-
ing bank risk taking.  Unlike existing tools, this one works by di-
rectly altering bank managers’ personal incentives with regard to 
risk,15 and unlike existing reform proposals, it is sufficiently flexi-
ble to be able to tailor bankers’ sensitivity to downside risk in light 
of their existing portfolios and their banks’ specific circumstances.  
In Part II, I explain the special regulatory and governance prob-
lems of banks.  High leverage combined with regulation-induced 
moral hazard make excessive risk taking a special problem at 
banks.  Part III recounts the pay-for-performance movement and its 
effect on the evolution of incentive pay for bankers.  The pay-for-
performance movement coincided with a decades-long trend of 
banking deregulation.  Together these overlapping trends have 
shaped the current equity-fueled structure of banker pay. Part IV 
describes my banker pay proposal.  Part V describes and critiques 
existing proposals for reform.  Part VI discusses implementation 
issues.  Part VII concludes. 
                                                 
15 “Unlike capital and asset regulation, which have at best indirect effects on managerial incen-
tives and thus on managerial decisions, altering top-management compensation is a direct and effec-
tive way of influencing managerial return and risk-taking incentives.”  Kose John, Anthony Saun-
ders, & Lemma W. Senbet, A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, 13 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 95, 97 (2000) (arguing that FDIC deposit insurance pricing should account for bank 
managers’ compensation arrangements). 
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II. THE BANK CONFIDENCE GAME 
Banks depend on public confidence for their survival.  Because 
of the importance of the financial system, the states and the federal 
government act to instill public confidence in banks.  Since the 
1930s, deposit insurance has been a critical element in this confi-
dence game, but as with insurance generally, deposit insurance 
creates moral hazard:  bankers will take greater risks than they 
would without the insurance.  This side effect requires government 
supervision of banking activities.  This Part explains the basics of 
the bank confidence game, its potential for encouraging excessive 
risk taking at banks, and the difficulties of crafting an adequate 
regulatory response. 
 
A. Bank Runs 
Banks are special institutions and very different from other 
businesses.  First, they are highly leveraged.  They carry far more 
debt, relative to the value of their assets, than most other busi-
nesses.  With leverage, shareholders and their agents prefer riskier 
bets than if the firm had no debt, because the payoffs from lever-
aged bets are asymmetric.  Shareholders enjoy unlimited payoffs 
from a successful high-risk bet with borrowed money, but limited 
liability assures that they lose only the amount of their investment 
in the firm should the high-risk bet turn out badly. Remaining 
losses are born by the firm’s creditors.16 
In addition to high leverage, bank assets and liabilities are 
mismatched.17  Most of their liabilities are volatile, taking the form 
of customer deposits that must be repaid upon demand.  Though it 
is relatively unlikely that all or even most of a bank’s customers 
would demand repayment of their deposits concurrently,18 the de-
mand nature of the liabilities means that banks are to some extent 
always dealing with uncertainty regarding their cash outlays.  In 
                                                 
16 See infra note 24. 
17 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt:  Covenants, the Credit Market, and Cor-
porate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 654 (describing the traditional banking function of balanc-
ing mismatched assets and liabilities). 
18 When this happens, of course, this is the dreaded bank run. 
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essence, they worry that all (or a significant portion of) their 
loans—in the form of customers’ deposits—will be called at 
once.19 
Banks’ assets, on the other hand, primarily take the form of 
longer-term loans—medium- to long-term promises of regular pe-
riodic payments from their borrowers.  Because of this mismatch 
of relatively illiquid assets with extremely liquid liabilities, banks 
are vulnerable to runs.  Historically, even rumors of a bank’s im-
minent failure might set off a race among its depositors to with-
draw their funds from the bank all at once.  Of course, no bank 
holds cash sufficient to meet all of its depositors’ simultaneous 
withdrawal demands.  Banks lend almost all of the money out.  
With a bank run, individual depositors face a collective action 
problem.  If an individual depositor fears that many other deposi-
tors are racing to the bank to withdraw their funds before the bank 
fails, then that individual depositor is forced to do the same.  She 
will want to get her money out while the bank still has cash.  The 
run becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the liquidity crunch 
will cause even a solvent bank to fail. 
In this sense, then, commercial banking is something of a con-
fidence game.  While high leverage encourages risk taking, a 
commercial bank survives only as long as its depositors are confi-
dent of its continuing solvency and ability to meet withdrawal de-
mands.  Historically, banking laws have attempted various strate-
gies to curb banks’ risk taking and to improve depositor confidence 
in banks and the banking system.20  Today, federal deposit insur-
ance serves as a principal bulwark for depositor confidence.  
 
                                                 
19 Banking regulators set reserve requirements, mandating that banks hold some minimum 
amount of readily accessible funds to be able to meet depositors’ withdrawal demands.  cite 
20 For example, unlimited or double liability for bank shareholders was a common approach in 
the 1800s.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance Prob-
lems of Banks:  A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 331 (2003).  Double liability made bank share-
holders personally liable for an amount equal to the amount they had invested in their shares of the 
bank.  Id. Courts have also periodically imposed special fiduciary duties on bank directors during or 
after banking crises.  Patricia McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Bank-
ing, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (describing the cyclicality of court decisions applying the 
business judgment rule to directors of failed banks); Macey & O’Hara, supra, at 335-37 (discussing 
cases).   
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B. Deposit Insurance and Banker Moral Hazard 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress established the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure the depos-
its of member banks.21  The federal guarantee of bank deposits 
prevents most runs because depositors are confident that FDIC in-
surance will cover failed banks’ deposit liabilities.22   
Deposit insurance has some nasty side effects, though.  Even 
with nonfinancial firms, which are less levered and not generally at 
risk of having to pay off their major liabilities on demand, a con-
flict exists between equity holders and creditors.  As the finance 
canon has taught us, debt and equity generally hold differing risk 
preferences.  The flip side of shareholders’ preference for risky 
bets at creditors’ expense is creditors’ preference for more conser-
vative strategies.  Creditors enjoy only a fixed upside—their inter-
est payments and return of principal at a loan’s maturity—and they 
enjoy a priority over equity in terms of repayment:  Creditors are 
repaid before equity receives any return.23  Creditors would there-
fore rather avoid the higher-risk, potentially higher-return bets that 
shareholders prefer.24  High leverage generally magnifies this debt-
                                                 
21 Banking Act of 1933.  
22 Until recently, the ceiling on deposit insurance was $100,000 per depositor.  On October 3, 
2008, the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act temporarily raised the basic limit to 
$250,000, which is set to return to $100,000 after December 31, 2009.  Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  See also FDIC, Financial Institu-
tion Letter FIL-102-2008 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08102.pdf.  Historically, the FDIC has reimbursed 
all failed banks’ deposits, even those in excess of the cap on insured deposits. 
23 In practice, this means that a firm must be solvent in order for the firm to make any distribu-
tion to equity holders and that upon dissolution, creditors are repaid in full before equity holders 
receive any distribution.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40(c) (requiring that in order for a distribu-
tion to shareholders to be made, the corporation must be solvent and able to pay its debts as they 
become due after giving effect to the distribution); 14.09(a) (requiring the directors to pay or provide 
for the payment of claims before making distributions of assets to shareholders). 
24 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing the agency costs of debt 
versus equity).  
A concrete example will illustrate.  Assume a firm owes $90 of debt, it has $100 in cash, 
and it has two investment options for its $100 in cash, a high-risk option and a low-risk option.  The 
firm will pursue one of its investment options, and then whatever the outcome, the firm will liquidate 
and distribute its assets to repay creditors, with shareholders receiving any residual. 
The low-risk option has two possible outcomes: 
1. 60% chance of returning $110, and 
2. 40% chance of returning $90. 
This low-risk option’s expected value to the firm is $102 ((60% x $110) + (40% x $90), or $66 + 
$36).  Net of the $100 investment, the firm expects a gain of $2. 
  The firm’s high-risk option has two possible outcomes: 
(continued next page) 
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equity conflict and managers’ risk taking tendencies.25  The higher 
the leverage, the greater is the conflict.26 
With banks, this agency cost of debt is even worse.  Not only 
are banks highly leveraged, but their capital structures are not like 
those of ordinary firms.  Ordinary firms’ contract creditors, under-
standing firm managers’ risk taking predilections, bargain for con-
straints on risk taking and monitor compliance.27  In addition, ex-
cessive risk taking increases borrowing costs for ordinary nonfi-
nancial companies.  At the limit, a risky firm may not be able to 
borrow at any price.  Banks, however, face a very different situa-
tion.  Much of their borrowing takes the form of demand deposits 
from many small, widely dispersed customers.  Because these cus-
tomer-creditors enjoy deposit insurance, they do not impose the 
contractual or market constraints on bank risk taking that creditors 
ordinarily impose on non-banking firms.  Insured depositors do not 
monitor or price their credit to account for insolvency or liquidity 
                                                                                                             
1. 10% chance of returning $1,000, and  
2. 90% chance of returning $0. 
This high-risk option’s expected value to the firm is $100 ((10% x $1,000) + (90% x $0), or $100 + 
$0).  Net of the $100 investment, the firm expects no gain from this investment. 
 The low-risk investment is clearly better for the firm and for creditors.  Creditors will prefer 
the safer, low-risk investment because they will be repaid in full in any event.  Whichever outcome 
occurs, the firm will still have at least $90 to pay creditors.  By contrast, with the high-risk invest-
ment, creditors face a 90% chance of being paid nothing. 
 Shareholders, however, will prefer the high-risk investment because its expected return to them 
is much higher than with the low-risk investment.  Consider the distribution of value as between 
creditors and shareholders with the low-risk investment.  The expected value of the $102 return is 
shared $90 to creditors and $12 to shareholders.  (Creditors’ return is (60% x $90) + (40% x $90) = 
$90; shareholders expect to receive ((60% x $20) + (40% x $0)) or $12). 
 Now consider the distribution of returns from the high-risk investment.  If the investment suc-
ceeds, creditors would be paid in full, receiving their $90; if the investment fails, creditors receive 
nothing.  Because there is only a 10% likelihood of full payment to creditors, and a 90% chance they 
will receive nothing, their expected return is ((10% x $90) + (90% x $0)) = $9.  Shareholders on the 
other hand expect to receive ((10% x $910) + (90% x $0)) or $91. 
 So even though the risky investment is worth less to the firm overall and much worse for credi-
tors in expected value terms, shareholders would push for the risky investment since its expected 
return to them of $91 is much higher than their expected return of $12 from the low-risk investment.  
More generally, because of their differing rights to the firm’s returns, creditors and equity holders 
value investment opportunities differently, with creditors being more conservative and equity hold-
ers being more risk preferring.   
25 Id.; Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 
J. FIN. 949 (1993). 
26 The modern bank holding company structure, in which a holding company owns banks along 
with nonbank businesses as affiliates, intensifies this debt-equity conflict.  The conflict is more 
severe because holding company equity holders are effectively subordinated to both the debt of the 
holding company and the debt of the banking subsidiary.  See infra Part IV.D. 
27 Banks, for example, play an important monitoring role to constrain their borrowers’ risk tak-
ing.  See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room:  The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in 
Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009). 
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risk because FDIC insurance covers the risk.  Bankers may shirk or 
steal; they may faithfully pursue wealth maximization for share-
holders by extending risky high-interest loans.  In any event, in-
sured depositors don’t care.  They are largely indifferent to bank 
risk taking, so they do not impose the constraints that creditors 
typically demand with nonfinancial firms.  
The product market discipline that affects nonfinancial firms 
also does not operate well on banks.  In a competitive market for 
deposit taking and other financial services, customers selecting a 
bank would care about bank solvency and would channel their de-
posits accordingly,28 but deposit insurance blunts the effect of fi-
nancial stability as a margin of competition among banks.29  
Moreover, deposit insurance premiums are not finely calibrated to 
account for the particular risks posed by individual banks,30 so ab-
sent perfect regulatory oversight, bankers have incentive to exter-
nalize losses to the insurance pool—and indirectly to the healthy 
banks that contribute to the pool and the taxpayers that ultimately 
stand behind the insurance pool. 
Finally, as with nonfinancial firms, bank managers’ risk taking 
incentives intensify as the bank nears insolvency, only more so.  
Note that insolvency is merely the extreme case of high leverage, 
where a firm’s shareholders have nothing left to lose, and manag-
ers are effectively betting with creditors’ money.  As in the high 
leverage scenario, managers intent on benefiting shareholders may 
take high-risk, even negative expected value bets, to creditors’ det-
riment.31  This problem is exacerbated with banks.  A nonfinancial 
firm on the skids will run out of cash to invest.  A bank, by con-
trast, can raise the cash to double down by continuing to borrow.  
By raising deposit interest rates, banks can continue to attract cash 
                                                 
28 The opacity of bank risk taking might as a practical matter preclude depositors and other un-
sophisticated outsiders from imposing market discipline on banks, even in the absence of deposit 
insurance.  Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision:  Why Is It Important and What Are the 
Issues?,  in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION:  WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 1, 8 (Frederic S. Mish-
kin, ed. 2001) [hereinafter PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION].  One could imagine, though, that in the ab-
sence of deposit insurance and government supervision, private information intermediaries might 
emerge to meet depositors’ demands for information on individual banks’ risk taking.   
29 Financial stability is not wholly irrelevant to consumers, of course.  Not all consumer finan-
cial products offered by banks are insured.  The same is true for deposit accounts in excess of the 
FDIC insured limit. 
30 See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
31 See Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract:  Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for 
Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 820-23 (2008) (explaining shareholder-wealth-maximizing manag-
ers’ perverse incentives when the firm is at or near insolvency). 
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because of the government insurance.  A troubled bank therefore 
does not suffer the same liquidity constraints the capital markets 
impose on nonfinancial companies in distress.  
  
C. Bank Risk Regulation 
Deposit insurance does not eliminate a creditor, of course; it 
merely substitutes the government for insured depositors as the 
major creditor of the bank.  The government as creditor has an 
economic interest in constraining managerial slack and excessive 
risk taking.  Regulatory agencies and their bank examiners repre-
sent the government in this endeavor.  Unlike private creditors of 
nonfinancial firms, however, regulators do not have their own 
money on the line.  So while they possess significant expertise and 
enjoy important regulatory powers, they may lack the strong incen-
tives of private lenders toward efficient monitoring.  Private lend-
ers with their own money on the line will expend resources moni-
toring only to the point where the marginal cost of monitoring does 
not exceed the marginal benefit.  Government regulators do not 
have such finely honed incentives.  The extent of their monitoring 
is politically determined.  In some cases, their regulation and su-
pervision may be excessive; in others, it may be insufficient.32  The 
prospect of regulatory capture of course also lurks. 
In addition to incentive problems, regulators may suffer from 
information deficits in the face of financial innovation.33  Innova-
tion often transcends regulatory classifications or lines of regula-
tory authority, making it quite difficult for regulators to keep up.34  
More generally, accurately quantifying the credit risk in a bank’s 
loan portfolio is no simple task.35 
                                                 
32 Regulatory forbearance may be an especially tricky problem.  See infra notes 122-124 and 
accompanying text. 
33 Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Information Failure and the 
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1463 (noting the consensus that “regu-
latory information failure” is a serious impediment to effective financial regulation); Charles K. 
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447424. 
34 Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of 
a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 333, 399 (1989) (describing the fragmentation of 
legal and political authority that makes regulation difficult in the face of financial innovation).  
35 See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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Especially when an economy is booming, it may be difficult 
for regulators to rein in bank risk taking,36 which would curtail the 
supply of credit to profitable (or potentially profitable) enterprises.  
In good economic times, investors in firms and banks will want 
their firms to take risks and their banks to finance them, and they 
may incentivize managers to do so. 
                                                 
36 Raghuram Rajan, Cycle-Proof Regulation, ECONOMIST, April 8, 2009.  
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III. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Analysts have decried the role of perverse managerial incen-
tives in precipitating the Financial Crisis.37  As prelude to the de-
tailed presentation of my proposal, this Part offers a short history 
of banker pay for performance leading up to the Crisis.  Two paral-
lel decades-long trends—the steady march of banking deregulation 
and the trend toward equity-based performance pay generally—
help explain the evolution toward the high-powered equity incen-
tives for bankers that we observe pre-Crisis.  
For bank managers, standard equity-based incentive pay may 
encourage excessive risk taking that is inimical to the public inter-
est in bank safety and soundness.  Aligning managers’ interests 
more closely with those of bank equity holders exacerbates the 
moral hazard that accompanies deposit insurance.  It gives bankers 
a direct personal stake in the unlimited upside they might poten-
tially enjoy from high risk, high return strategies38—an approach 
that bank regulators typically wish to discourage.39 
An understanding of how we arrived at the pre-Crisis state of 
executive compensation arrangements offers useful context for for-
mulating policy going forward. 
 
A. Pay for Performance for Shareholders 
Standard corporate governance arrangements such as fiduciary 
duties and shareholder voting are generally designed to align man-
agers’ decision making with the interests of the firm’s equity hold-
ers,40 who are generally viewed as the firm’s “owners.”41  Simi-
                                                 
37 See, e.g., supra note 2; Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too 
Much?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009 (decrying the role of badly designed executive compensation 
plans in encouraging the managerial short-termism that led to the financial crisis). 
38 “[H]igher pay-performance sensitivity in management compensation aggravates the well-
known risk-shifting incentives associated with risky debt.”  John & Qian, infra note 80, at 110. 
39 One commentator even argues that pay-performance sensitivity should be accounted for in 
the pricing of deposit insurance.  See John, Saunders, & Senbet, supra note 15. 
40 Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara have suggested broadened fiduciary duties for bank 
directors to include creditors along with shareholders as beneficiaries.  In particular, they propose 
that bank directors consider solvency risk “explicitly and systematically” in their decision making, 
upon pain of personal liability for failing to do so.  Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The 
Corporate Governance of Banks, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., April 2003, at 91, 92.  This approach 
(continued next page) 
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larly, pay for performance—typically in the form of equity or eq-
uity-based options—intends to overcome managers’ shirking and 
risk aversion in order to align their incentives with shareholders’ 
more risk-preferring interests.42 
The pay-for-performance movement of the 1990s led boards of 
directors and their compensation consultants to adopt equity-based 
compensation schemes.43  Tax code changes abetted this trend.44 
As a result of these changes,45 the percentage of executive com-
pensation in the form of equity jumped from 37% to 55% in the ten 
years ending in 2003.46  Pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs—
typically measured by the change in CEO wealth for every $1,000 
change in shareholder wealth47—increased more than tenfold be-
tween 1980 and 1999.48   
Consistent with the finance canon, however,49 a greater mana-
gerial focus on improving shareholder returns means riskier in-
                                                                                                             
may be problematic, however.  Duties to multiple constituents may render bank managers account-
able to no one.  Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 
31-36 (1991) (arguing that other constituency statutes merely render managers accountable to no 
one).  More generally, corporate duties seem a rather blunt device for regulating risk taking, and may 
invite 20-20 hindsight litigation in the aftermath of a bank failure. 
41 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) 
(referring to shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation). 
42 Over three decades ago, Jensen and Meckling explained the agency conflicts that accompany 
outside investment in a firm.  Once outside equity holders are brought in as investors and firm man-
agers own less than all the residual interests in the firm, managers have incentive to shirk because 
they enjoy only a fraction of the benefits of their effort.  They must share with outside equity hold-
ers.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24.  Shirking becomes a problem because monitoring of mana-
gerial effort by outside investors may not be easy.  In addition, managers with firm-specific human 
capital investments in their firm might be less willing to pursue risky but potentially profitable pro-
jects.  Their undiversifiable human capital investments make them imperfect agents for diversified 
shareholders.  Jensen & Murphy, supra note 10, at 138.  With only fixed compensation, managers 
may also be tempted to build empires, since pay is typically associated with firm size.  Id. 
43 See, e.g., id.; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). 
44 Since 1994, only the first $1 million of non-performance based compensation for public 
company executives is deductible.  Internal Revenue Code § 162(m).  Ironically, these tax law 
changes were intended to curb total executive pay, but it has not worked out as planned.  Gregg D. 
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 
(2007 (explaining why § 162(m) has led to higher executive compensation and lower shareholder 
wealth, contrary to its original purposes).   
45 Evidence suggests that the enactment of § 162(m) has reduced salaries and increased pay-
performance sensitivity.  See Tod Perry & Mark Zenner, Pay for Performance?:  Government Regu-
lation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. 453 (2001). 
46 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 283, 289 & tbl. 4 (2005), available at http://ssnr.com/abstract=648682. 
47 See Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay, supra note 43. 
48 Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of US Corporate Governance: What's 
Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 12 (2003). 
49 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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vestment strategies that place more risk on creditors.50  Whether 
pay for performance has been generally good for shareholders is 
the subject of some debate.51  Nonetheless, compensation for bank 
officers before the Financial Crisis tracked the same basic share-
holder-based incentive framework, and managers’ equity stakes 
have been shown to be significantly correlated with bank returns 
and risk.52 
 
B. The Evolution of Incentive Pay for Bankers 
Banking deregulation and performance incentives for bank 
management have more or less gone hand-in-hand since the late 
1970s.  This is consistent with more general empirical and theo-
retical work showing an inverse relation between regulation and 
pay-performance sensitivity.  Within and across regulated indus-
tries, regulation has been associated with lower pay-performance 
sensitivity in executive compensation,53 and pay-performance sen-
sitivity has generally increased with deregulation.54   
                                                 
50 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24. One study finds, for example, that bond return premiums 
increase with managerial ownership.  Elizabeth Strock Bagnani et al., Managers, Owners, and the 
Pricing of Risky Debt:  An Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453 (1994) (finding that among Fortune 
500 companies, managerial ownership of between five- and twenty-five percent is associated with 
higher bond return premiums). Bond holders understand that managers more closely aligned with 
shareholder interests will tend to adopt riskier investment strategies in pursuit of higher shareholder 
returns.  Because this increases risk to bond holders, rational bond holders demand higher premiums 
for this risk.  Id. 
51 For critical views, see LUCIAN BECHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. 
Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Com-
pensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating:  The Corporate 
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN 
SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991). 
52 Anthony Saunders, Elizabeth Strock, and Nickolaos G. Travlos, Ownership Structure, De-
regulation and Bank Risk-Taking, 45 J. FIN. 643 (1990).  See also Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. 
Stulz, supra note 4, at 1 (finding that better alignment of CEO incentives with shareholder interests 
is associated with worse firm performance in the credit crisis).  
53 E.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1992) (using industry-level 
data from 1965-1985 to show that firms in regulated industries—insurance, banking, and gas and 
electric utilities—have lower executive compensation than in unregulated industries and make less 
use of stock and bonus plans); Paul Joskow, Nancy Rose, & Andrea Shepard, Regulatory Con-
straints on CEO Compensation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:  MICROECONOMICS 1  
(1993) (showing lower levels of CEO pay and lower pay-performance sensitivity for regulated firms 
than for unregulated firms).  
54 Stacey R. Kole & Kenneth M. Lehn, Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Struc-
ture:  the Case of the U.S. Airline Industry, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 79, 100 (1999) (finding that the value of 
airline CEO stock option grants increased after deregulation, and that this impact of deregulation 
increased over time); R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay and Performance:  Evidence 
(continued next page) 
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A prevailing agency theory explanation is that deregulation fa-
cilitates competition, which creates growth opportunities within the 
deregulated industry and increases managerial discretion.55  In this 
environment, investors may prefer to offer managers more power-
ful performance incentives for risk taking in pursuit of these new 
growth opportunities.56 At the same time, greater growth options 
make monitoring more difficult for outsider directors and share-
holders, so incentive compensation is relied upon to bond manag-
ers to shareholder interests.57  In the banking industry, deregulation 
has led to significant increases in growth opportunities, so it makes 
sense that increased pay-performance sensitivity should have ac-
companied the deregulation that occurred over the last four dec-
ades.  
States began to deregulate intrastate branching and interstate 
banking in the late 1970s.58  Before that, commercial banking was 
a relatively clubby, cozy business, with banks operating in fairly 
protected, geographically segmented markets.59  Not only was in-
                                                                                                             
from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105 (1995) (finding a positive association between 
bank CEO pay and firm performance in the 1980s and a stronger association in deregulated mar-
kets). 
55 Smith & Watts, supra note 53, at 275-76. 
56 Vicente Cuñat and Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in the Bank-
ing and Financial Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495, 496 (2009); M. Raith, Competition, Risk and 
Managerial Incentives, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 1425 (2003). 
57 Id. at 276; Eaton & Rose (1983). 
58 Crawford, Ezzell, & Miles, supra note 59, at 233 (noting that most states required reciproc-
ity); Hubbard & Palia, supra note 54 (describing state-level deregulation of interstate banking begin-
ning in the early 1980s).   
59 Consistent with agency theory, incentive pay was small relative to fixed compensation.  
Growth opportunities were relatively few, so there was little need to spur risk taking with incentive 
compensation.  Anthony J. Crawford, John R. Ezzell, & James A. Miles, Bank CEO Pay-
Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. BUS. 231 (1995) (finding no statisti-
cally significant relation between CEO salary and bonus and shareholder wealth and no statistically 
significant pay-performance sensitivity of CEO option holdings prior to deregulation, with 1982 as a 
pivotal year); Joel F. Houston & Christopher James, CEO Compensation and Bank Risk:  Is Com-
pensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, J. MONETARY ECON. 405, 407 (1995) 
(finding lower bank CEO stock holdings and less reliance on option-based compensation than in 
other industries, reflecting differences in investment opportunities, for banks from 1980-1990).  See 
also Hubbard & Palia, supra note 54, at 108 (noting that increased competition from bank deregula-
tion requires a more capable CEO and higher and more responsive pay).  This all changed with 
deregulation, which brought increased competition to commercial banking, as well as more perform-
ance-based pay for bank executives and increased pay-performance sensitivity. Crawford, Ezzell, & 
Miles, supra note 59 (investigating bank CEO compensation from 1976-1988); Hubbard & Palia, 
supra note 54 (examining bank CEO pay in the 1980s); Cuñat and Guadalupe, supra note 56 (testing 
effects of banking deregulation from 1992-2002). 
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terstate banking not permitted,60 but most states limited the size 
and geographical scope of banks operating within their borders.61  
These constraints effectively limited the territorial scope of compe-
tition, carving up banking markets within each state.  At the start of 
banking deregulation, only twelve states allowed unrestricted 
branching.62  By 1990, thirty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia had removed all intrastate branching restrictions.63  
Interstate banking received a boost at the federal level in 1982: 
an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act sanctioned in-
terstate acquisition of failed banks and thrifts regardless of state 
law.64  Many states followed by entering into reciprocal multistate 
agreements freely allowing bank acquisitions among participant 
states.  By 1989, forty-four states and the District of Columbia al-
lowed some interstate banking.65 
Continuing this trend, the Riegle-Neal Act (RNA) formally un-
leashed interstate banking across all states in 1994.66  Then in 
1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization 
Act (GLB) formally repealed the Depression-era barriers among 
banking, insurance, and securities activities.  This allowed for the 
formation of multi-line financial services firms in the form of bank 
holding companies.67  These important deregulatory statutes 
pushed commercial banks further out of their cozy protected mar-
kets,68 forcing them not only to compete with one another across 
                                                 
60 States enjoyed the power to block interstate banking under the Douglas Amendment to the 
1956 Bank Holding Company Act, which barred a bank holding company from acquiring a bank 
outside its home state without the approval of the target bank’s state. 
61 In “unit” banking states, branching was strictly prohibited.  In effect, each bank was permit-
ted only one place of business—its unit bank—within the state.  Other states allowed only limited 
branching. 
62 K.J. Stiroh & P. E. Strahan, Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation:  Evidence from US 
Banking, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 801, 806 (2003). 
63 Id.at 808, tbl. 1. 
64 Garn-St. Germain Act.  See also Kroszner & Strahan at 1442 (1999). The range of permissi-
ble products that depository institutions could offer was broadened in 1980.  Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act (1982) (commercial banks); Depository Institution Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act (1980) (nonbanks).  Federal interest rate ceilings were phased out in the early 
1980s.  DIDMCA at __. 
65 Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 62 at 808, tbl. 1. 
66 Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. 
67 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  Before GLB, bank holding company structures were permitted 
through the regulatory discretion of federal banking regulators.  Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of 
Banking:  Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP L. 691, 692 (2000).  Perhaps the most 
significant effect of GLB was to allow investment banks to acquire commercial banks.  Commercial 
banks were already being allowed by regulators to acquire investment banking operations by the 
time of GLB’s passage.  Id. at 694. 
68 Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 56, at 497. 
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state lines,69 but also to compete with diversified financial firms 
with insurance and securities businesses as well as traditional 
commercial banking.  
Deregulation had salutary pro-competitive effects,70 and em-
pirical studies bear out the agency theory predictions for banker 
compensation discussed earlier.  Increased competition led to 
greater growth opportunities in commercial banking, and share-
holders wished to incentivize their managers to pursue these op-
portunities.71  Pay-performance sensitivity for bank CEOs in-
creased significantly.72 
Studies show that bank managers performed better with higher 
insider stock ownership in the 1980s, especially in deregulated 
markets.73  Consistent with agency theory, however, and borne out 
                                                 
69 On the heels of the RNA, the total number of bank branches per capita in the US increased, 
as did the average number of banks operating at the state level and the average number of states in 
which a bank operated.  Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, 
Quality, and Bank Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567 (2006). 
70 The costs and pricing of banking services fell.  Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, Entry Re-
strictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency:  Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J. 
L. & ECON. 239 (1998). States that dismantled intrastate branching restrictions saw faster growth 
after deregulation.  Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from 
Bank Branch Deregulation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 639 (1996).  Interstate competition also led to realloca-
tion of assets to more efficient banks. Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 62, at 804. 
71 Crawford, Ezzell, & Miles, supra note 59, at 232. 
72 Id. at 232 (finding significant increases in pay-performance sensitivity changes as to salary 
plus bonus, stock options, and stock ownership between 1976-1988); Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra 
note 56, at 496 (investigating the 1992-2002 period); Elijah Brewer III, William Curt Hunter, & 
William Jackson III, Deregulation and the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation and 
Risk-Taking, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper WP 2003-32, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=486985.  
For example, relative to other financial company executives, following the passage of the 
RNA, commercial bank executives enjoyed an additional thirty-six cent increase in option value for 
every $1,000 increase in shareholder value. Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 56, at 503.  After GLB’s 
passage, pay-performance sensitivity for financial executives’ total pay saw a marginal increase of 
24% relative to executive pay in nonfinancial service sectors, which amounted to an additional six 
cents in total pay for every dollar increase in shareholder wealth.  Id. at 502.  While total pay in-
creased only marginally with the 1990s deregulation, its composition changed dramatically.  Total 
fixed compensation fell, but incentive pay rose, becoming a larger share of total pay.  Id.  To test for 
effects of the RNA, the study compared bank executive compensation with a control group of other 
financial companies both before and after bank deregulation.  Id. at 497.  With respect to GLB, the 
study compared financial sector executive compensation with compensation of executives in the 
remaining service sectors in the economy.  Id. at 498. 
Crawford, Ezell, and Miles also find some evidence that CEO pay-performance sensitivity in-
creased more at less well-capitalized banks after deregulation, suggesting more severe moral hazard 
problems at these riskier banks.  Crawford, Ezzell, & Miles, supra note 59, at 233.    
73 R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay and Performance:  Evidence from the U.S. 
Banking Industry, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 105 (1995) (finding a positive association between bank CEO pay 
and performance in the 1980s and a stronger association in deregulated markets); Rebel A. Cole & 
Hamid Mehran, The Effect of Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance:  Evidence from the 
Thrift Industry, 50 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (1998) (measuring stock returns for publicly traded thrifts that 
converted from mutual to stock ownership from 1983-1987). 
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by subsequent experience in the Financial Crisis, studies of past 
deregulatory periods show that risk taking may also be exacerbated 
in less regulated markets when bank directors and officers own 
large equity stakes,74 especially when the banks are under financial 
stress.75  
 
C. Banker Pay Preceding the Crisis 
By the time of the Financial Crisis, the incentive pay structure 
for bankers had come to resemble the standard shareholder-wealth-
maximizing approach to compensation used in unregulated indus-
tries.  Bankers’ pay immediately before the Crisis was substantial 
and mostly performance based.  It was also more equity laden rela-
tive to inside debt than for non-financial firms. 
As of the end of 2006, total bank holding company CEO pay 
averaged $7.9 million, and less than 10% of it was in the form of 
fixed salary.  The rest was performance based.76  Over 70% of 
BHC CEOs received equity compensation in 2006, and among 
them, equity compensation accounted for almost half of their total 
pay on average.77  As or more important, in addition to annual 
compensation, these CEOs already held large equity stakes in their 
firms.  Given their size, these equity portfolios generally have 
much stronger incentive effects than annual compensation.78  The 
average BHC CEO’s equity portfolio was worth $88.1 million, 
over ten times larger than the CEO’s total annual compensation, 
and over twenty times larger than the value of annual equity-based 
                                                 
74 Saunders et al., supra note 52 (1990) (finding greater risk taking in publicly traded banking 
organizations, during the 1979-1982 period of relative deregulation, when managers hold larger 
equity stakes); Ronald C. Anderson & Donald R. Fraser, Corporate Control, Bank Risk Taking, and 
the Health of the Banking Industry, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1838 (2000) (finding a positive associa-
tion between management shareholdings and greater bank-specific risk during the late 1980s, when 
banks were relatively less regulated and the industry was under stress). 
75 Anderson & Fraser, supra note 74, at 1397. 
76 Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 4, at 7. Performance based pay in their study includes both 
equity-based compensation and cash bonuses for performance achievements.  Their sample, con-
structed from financial firms with compensation data in Standand and Poors’ ExecuComp database, 
is dominated by large banks, though a few securities firms are also included.  Id. at 22, app. B.  The 
median firm has assets worth $15.5 billion, and mean asset value is $129.3 billion.  Id. at 6.  
77 Id. 
78 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 653 (1998); John E. Core & Wayne Guay,  The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal 
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT’G & ECON. 151 (1999). 
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compensation.79  The average BHC CEO’s share holdings 
amounted to 1.6% of the firm’s outstanding shares.80  The median 
BHC CEO also held more equity, less inside debt, and more equity 
relative to inside debt than the median CEO for non-financial 
firms.81 
Pay statistics mid-Crisis are consistent with this picture.  As of 
June 2008—in the lull between Bear Stearns’ collapse in March 
and the traumatic few weeks of September when Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG were 
taken over by the government—BHC CEO compensation re-
mained equity-fueled and generous.  Among twenty-four of the 
largest bank holding companies, annual CEO compensation ranged 
as high as $73 million, with 10 CEOs making in excess of $10 mil-
lion.82  As shown in Figure 1, CEOs of seventeen of these BHCs 
received over half their total compensation in the form of incentive 
pay.83  The average percentage of incentive pay for the group was 
61.4% of total compensation, with the median at 70.5%. 
 
    
                                                 
79 Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 4, at 8.  Twenty CEOs out of the ninety-five in the sample 
held equity stakes in their firms worth more than $100 million.  Richard Fuld’s equity stakes in 
Lehman Brothers exceeded $1 billion; James Caynes of Bear Stearns held equity stakes in his firm 
worth $953 million.  Id. 
80 Id. at 9.  Including delta-weighted options, the CEO’s ownership share increased to 2.4%.  
That is, for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth, the CEO’s wealth would increase by $24.  
Id.  By comparison, John & Qian found average annual CEO share holdings of 1.38% in a sample of 
over 600 CEO-years for commercial banks from 1992-2000. Kose John & Yiming Qian, Incentive 
Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., April 2003, at 
112 tbl. 1. 
81 Tung & Wang, supra note 9. 
82 Richard Shaw, Bank Executive Compensation and the Bailout  (citing data from The Corpo-
rate Library, June 2008), available at  www.qvmgroup.com/invest/archives/626 (visited January 29, 
2010).  The bank holding companies were the constituents of Keefe Bruyette & Woods’ Large Bank 
Index as of June 2008. 
83 Id. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
D. Post-Crisis Pay Constraints 
Though bank regulators have since 1991 enjoyed the explicit 
authority to regulate bankers’ pay to guard against excessive risk 
taking,84 this authority was seldom used before the Financial Crisis 
and never targeted at the large money center banks that have been 
the focus of the Financial Crisis.85  With its Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP),86 the Treasury department attempted to rein in 
                                                 
84 FDICIA empowers regulators to take enforcement action against compensation practices that 
might be unsafe or unsound banking practices; see infra note 199 and accompanying text; including 
not only compensation that is excessive but also compensation that creates incentives for excessive 
risk taking. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Refocusing Regulatory Limitations on Banks’ Compensation 
Practices, 37 B.C.L. REV. 861, 867-68 (1996).  Even before 1991, regulators might deem excessive 
compensation an unsafe or unsound banking practice.  See infra note 199. 
85 At one level, this historical lack of intervention is not surprising.  When institutions are prof-
itable and the economy is growing, regulatory tinkering with executive compensation is politically 
difficult.  Others have noted these cyclicality problems and called for countercyclical approaches to 
regulation.  See Raghuram Rajan, Cycle-Proof Regulation, THE ECONOMIST, April 8, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13446173. As this 
Financial Crisis has taught us, bank executive compensation is an especially important place to start 
thinking about countercyclical regulation. 
86 In the immediate aftermath of government takeovers at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG 
and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act (EESA) in October 2008.  Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  EESA authorized the 
(continued next page) 
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some of the perceived excess at firms receiving TARP aid, though 
TARP rules only vaguely address the perverse risk taking incen-
tives at work. 
These rules impose both corporate governance changes and 
substantive constraints on pay structure, including prohibitions on 
golden parachute payments and on compensation that encourages 
“unnecessary and excessive risks.”87  In addition, the Treasury De-
partment appointed Kenneth Feinberg to serve as a special master 
to oversee pay packages at TARP recipient institutions.88  Feinberg 
has slashed cash salaries in favor of long-term stock grants.89 
The Federal Reserve proposed much broader but similarly 
structured oversight of all incentive compensation arrangements at 
all of its regulated institutions,90 and not just TARP recipients.  
                                                                                                             
Treasury Department to spend $700 billion to shore up the nation’s financial system, pursuant to 
which the Treasury Department devised TARP.  The following February, Congress enacted the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), which 
amended EESA by imposing significant new restrictions on executive compensation for firms re-
ceiving TARP financial assistance.  Pursuant to ARRA authorization, both the Treasury Department 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rules implementing ARRA’s executive 
compensation restrictions. 
87 ARRA § 7001 (describing executive compensation limits).  A golden parachute is essentially 
a generous severance arrangement.  The rules also limit bonus payments, retention awards, and 
incentive compensation to CEOs and other highly compensated employees.  U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, June 10, 2009, 
available at: http://www.treas.gov/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ 
ec%20ifr%20fr%20web%206.9.09tg164.pdf.  For example, incentive compensation is required to be 
in the form of restricted stock that does not vest until government loans are repaid.  Id.  Tax gross-
ups for highly compensated employees are also prohibited.  Id.  With a tax gross-up, the employer 
firm covers its employee’s income tax liabilities relating to her compensation. The rules also require 
that the firm’s Compensation Committee conduct a semiannual review of employee compensation 
plans to assess the risks posed to the institution.  Id. 
88 Feinberg’s primary role is to monitor compensation practices at firms receiving “exceptional 
financial assistance,” namely AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, General Motors Co., GMAC Inc., 
Chrysler Group LLC, and Chrysler Financial.  Recently, he nixed the multimillion dollar pay pack-
age of Ken Lewis, the retiring CEO of Bank of America, as well as slashing salaries of hundreds of 
other employees in these seven firms.  Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Czar to Slash 
Compensation at Seven Firms, WALL ST. J. A1, October 22, 2009. 
89 Id. (describing cash salary cap of $500,000 and the use of “salary stock” that cannot be sold 
for at least four years); Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Really Worth?, N.Y. TIMES MAGA-
ZINE, January 3, 2009, at 32 (same). Of the original seven, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Bank of 
America have arranged to pay off their TARP funds.  Id. at 32, 34 (noting that Citigroup and Bank of 
America will no longer be subject to Feinberg’s oversight after their TARP funds are repaid); Jessica 
Papini, Analysts:  Wells Fargo TARP Repayment Dilutive But Positive, WALL ST. J., December 15, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091215-711579.html (describing analysts’ 
reaction to the news of Wells Fargo’s repayment of its $25 billion in TARP funds). 
90 Damian Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath, Bankers Face Sweeping Curbs on Pay, WALL ST. J. A1, 
September 18, 2009.  Bank holding companies are the major institutions regulated by the Federal 
Reserve.  The largest banks are owned by bank holding companies. 
The G-20 group of important industrial and developing countries has also endorsed a set of 
compensation guidelines for financial institutions issued by the Financial Stability Board, a coalition 
of national financial authorities and international financial institutions.  Financial Stability Board, 
(continued next page) 
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According to the Federal Reserve’s proposed guidance, incentive 
compensation at banking organizations should: 
(a) provide employees incentives that do not encourage ex-
cessive risk-taking beyond the organization’s ability to effec-
tively identify and manage risk; 
(b) be compatible with effective controls and risk manage-
ment; and 
(c) be supported by strong corporate governance, including 
active and effective oversight by the organization’s board of di-
rectors.91 
Concurrent with its issuance of this new guidance on compensa-
tion, the Federal Reserve announced a supervisory initiative to re-
view of pay practices at all of its regulated entities.92 
While these government efforts constrain or prohibit certain 
pay practices felt to be most egregious in terms of enabling either 
too much pay or excessive risk taking, many of the prescriptions 
are vague, and on the whole, they lack a positive theory for what 
banker pay should look like.93  The next Part discusses my ap-
proach. 
                                                                                                             
FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices:  Implementation Standards, September 25, 2009, 
available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf. 
91 Federal Reserve System, Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies 5 
(cite Fed Reg. date).  
92 Pursuant to this initiative, the Federal Reserve commenced (i) a coordinated review of incen-
tive compensation practices at twenty-eight large, complex banking organizations (LCBOs); and (ii) 
a review of incentive compensation practices at regional, community, and other banking organiza-
tions not classified as LCBOs as part of the regular risk-focused examination process.  Id. at 8. 
93 The exception is Pay Czar Kenneth Feinberg’s approach, which I discuss in Part __. 
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IV. PAYING FOR LESS RISKY PERFORMANCE 
Though the idea of pay for performance is decades old, until 
recently, its only application had been to incentivize managers to 
improve shareholder returns.  Since the Financial Crisis, however, 
it has become clear that the structure of banker pay has conse-
quences for bank risk regulation.  Bank examination and supervi-
sion, as well as capital requirements, impose important limits on 
bank risk taking and help assure bank solvency.  However, these 
approaches seem incomplete for not directly addressing managerial 
incentives.94  Instead of relying solely on these external influences, 
regulators may be able to bond bankers to more prudent banking 
practices with pay-performance incentives that include instruments 
that are sensitive to risk.  At the same time, regulatory attention to 
the structure of management incentives may offer an important 
tool to enable better trade offs between risk taking and regulation. 
I propose to constrain bank risk taking by paying bankers in 
part with their banks’ public subordinated debt securities.  Empiri-
cal research shows that as the proportion of a CEO’s wealth held in 
the form of firm debt increases relative to the value of her equity 
holdings, risk taking declines.  Including debt in bankers’ pay ar-
rangements and making debt a greater share of their personal port-
folios would reduce bankers’ risk taking incentives.  The presence 
of this debt shifts bankers’ personal interests away from risk-
preferring equity to align more closely with more risk averse debt 
holders,95 which also aligns with regulators’ interest in assuring 
banks’ safety and soundness.96  Publicly traded subordinated debt 
                                                 
94 See John, Saunders, & Senbet, supra note 15. 
95 “Top management should . . . be given incentives to act on behalf of debtholders to an ade-
quate degree. . . .  [P]roviding managers with compensation structures that have low pay-
performance sensitivity may be optimal.”  John & Qian, supra note 80, at 110. 
Such compensation would admittedly dissuade bank executives from the traditional pursuit of 
value for shareholders that is sometimes viewed as corporate managers’ exclusive goal.  This should 
not give us much pause, however.  Bank governance has traditionally been recognized as presenting 
special concerns that deserve special governance tools.  For example, courts have periodically im-
posed special heightened fiduciary duties for bank directors.  See McCoy, supra note 20.  Histori-
cally, unlimited or double liability for bank shareholders was common.  See Macey & O’Hara, supra 
note 20.  Macey and O’Hara have also proposed that bank directors’ fiduciary duties be broadened to 
include creditors as well as shareholders.  See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 40. 
96 Perfect alignment of course may not necessarily be desirable; regulators might be perfectly 
happy with low-risk, low-growth strategies that might be socially suboptimal.  Too much debt in 
managers’ compensation packages may make them suboptimally risk averse, reducing long term 
(continued next page) 
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securities may be ideal for this task because the trading price will 
operate as a continuing referendum on risk taking at the bank.  
Market pricing of this debt will be particularly sensitive to down-
side risk, so its presence in bankers’ personal portfolios will give 
bankers direct personal incentives to avoid excessive risk.  
I first discuss recent learning on the effects of inside debt hold-
ings on managerial risk taking.  I then explain the use of sub-debt 
for market discipline, describing its appropriate features.  The next 
Part describes recent banker pay proposals by Bhagat and Romano 
and by Bebchuk and Spamann and compares these approaches 
with mine. 
   
A. Inside Debt Compensation 
Conventional wisdom holds that corporate managers’ pay 
comes in two basic forms:  cash and equity-based compensation.97  
They do not hold inside debt—the debt of their own firms.98  Re-
cent research shows, however, that managers in fact do hold sig-
nificant amounts of inside debt in the form of pensions and de-
ferred compensation.99  These fixed aspects of executive compen-
sation serve to some extent as debt-like compensation, since fixed 
compensation by definition promises a return that does not vary 
with firm performance.  Instead, these forms of compensation give 
managers fixed claims against the firm.   
These inside debt claims may be substantial.  By the time Jack 
Welch retired as the CEO of General Electric in 2001, the present 
value of his pension benefits plus deferred compensation is esti-
mated to have exceeded $109 million.100  Also as of the end of 
2006, at least seven public company CEOs held inside debt bal-
                                                                                                             
value. Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later:  Inside Debt and Its Role in 
Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Im-
proving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, Boston University School of Law Working Paper 
No. 09-22, April 29, 2009, at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396663. 
97 Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 96, at 1551; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005). 
98 Alex Edmans, Inside Debt 2 (Wharton School Working Paper, Dec. 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=758508. 
99 Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 96; Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions 
to Disclosures of CEO Pensions and Deferred Compensation:  An Empirical Analysis, December 
2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462475. 
100 Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 96, at 1552. 
26 FREDERICK TUNG   
DRAFT JULY 22, 2010 
ances in excess of $100MM.101  In one sample of Fortune 500 
CEOs, the pension component of total compensation for CEOs age 
sixty-one to sixty-five was 40% larger on average than their base 
salary, and equaled 23% of equity compensation.102 
Though the possibility of including debt in executives’ com-
pensation arrangements has until quite recently been largely ig-
nored,103 a nascent body of literature offers strong preliminary 
support for the notion that holding fixed claims against the firm 
may dampen CEOs’ risk-taking incentives.104 Alex Edmans has 
shown theoretically that inside debt may be part of an optimal 
compensation arrangement.105  While equity compensation incen-
tivizes managers to exert more effort—thereby addressing the 
agency costs of equity—inside debt counters the risk shifting in-
centives that accompany equity compensation, thereby reducing 
the agency costs of debt.106  Giving managers a stake in the value 
of the firm’s debt makes them less willing to sacrifice its value to 
benefit shareholders.  This is especially important when the firm is 
in distress.  Debt compensation can improve managerial effort and 
firm value in distress situations because unlike equity, debt is sen-
sitive to the firm’s liquidation value.  That is, debt holders may still 
recover value when the firm is in distress.  By contrast, equity is 
worthless once the firm is insolvent.107  Managers holding inside 
debt may therefore be less inclined to make risky bets when the 
                                                 
101 Wei & Yermack supra note 99, at 6 n.2. 
102 Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 96, at 1554. 
103 “Implicit in virtually all of this [executive compensation] research is the assumption that 
managerial compensation consists of only two components, namely, cash and equity-linked instru-
ments.” Id. 
104 See id; Joseph Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal 
Contracting, Pension Research Council Working Paper 2007-5, April 23, 2007, at 23, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982180 (finding a positive association between the presence of pension 
benefits and higher quality debt ratings, suggesting that pension benefits may reduce risk taking); 
Edmons. 
105 Edmans, supra note 98, at 3. 
106 While Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of equity and debt separately; Jensen 
& Meckling, supra note 24; Edmans considers them simultaneously, thereby enabling analysis of the 
trade offs between incentivizing managerial effort and influencing investment choice.  See Edmans, 
supra note 98, at 3 & n.4. 
107 Equity holders are indifferent to the firm’s liquidation value because that value goes to pay 
creditors.  So while equity-based compensation gives managers incentive to avoid insolvency, it may 
also induce them to “inefficiently sacrifice liquidation value to gamble for solvency” when a firm is 
in distress.  Id. at 3.  Debt holders will be less sanguine about squandering value on desperate in-
vestment strategies because their returns are fixed; they will not share in any (low probability but) 
stupendous returns beyond the fixed amount of their claims.  Id. 
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firm gets into trouble.108  Especially for firms with high leverage—
like banks—a high probability of default, and other severe risk-
shifting incentives, debt may be an important component of opti-
mal executive compensation.109 
Empirical evidence also supports the idea that inside debt may 
dampen managers’ risk taking incentives.  Several studies focus on 
CEO pensions and deferred compensation, recognizing these as 
forms of inside debt.  Rangarajan Sundaram and David Yermack 
find that as the value of a CEO’s pension increases relative to the 
value of her equity holdings, risk taking declines.110  The effect is 
especially strong when the CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds her 
firm’s debt equity ratio.111  Chenyang Wei and David Yermack 
find evidence that investors expect firm managers to manage more 
conservatively as their inside debt holdings increase.112  Wei and 
Yermack examine the reaction of public debt and equity markets to 
new disclosures on the value of CEOs’ pensions and deferred 
compensation in 2007.113  They find that when the CEO’s inside 
debt-equity ratio exceeds her firm’s, the disclosure triggers a 
wealth transfer from equity holders to debt holders.114  Bond prices 
rise, while equity prices fall.115  In addition, the price volatility 
drops for both debt and equity.116  These market reactions are con-
sistent with the idea that investors expect managers to run their 
firms more conservatively—taking less risk—when they hold large 
inside debt positions.  
                                                 
108 The appropriate amount of debt depends on the relative magnitudes of the two different 
types of agency problems—shirking versus risk shifting.  Id.  
109 The appropriate amount of debt increases with leverage, the probability of default, and the 
manager’s ability to affect liquidation values, while debt should be reduced with increasing growth 
opportunities.  Id. 
110 Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 96, at 1555. They use “distance-to-default” as their 
measure of firm risk—basically the number of standard deviation decreases in firm value that would 
be required to put the firm in default.  Id.  They regress fixed effects panel data models with separate 
intercepts for each unique CEO-firm pair.  Id. at 1581.  See also Gerakos, supra note 104, at 23. 
111 When a CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds her firm’s debt-equity ratio, distance-to-default 
declines by 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations, which is statistically significant.  Sundaram & Yermack, 
supra note 96, at 1555. 
112 Wei & Yermack supra note 99.   
113 Beginning in 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring more exten-
sive executive compensation disclosures, including explicit valuations of officers’ pension benefits 
and deferred compensation.  cite reg.  Prior to the regulation’s implementation, precise valuation of 
these items was quite complicated and required the gathering of significant information outside of 
the firm’s public filings.  Wei & Yermack, supra note 99.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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Most recently, I and a co-author test for these effects of inside 
debt specifically in the context of the Financial Crisis.  We show 
that inside debt-equity ratios for bank holding company CEOs at 
the end of 2006 are positively associated with better BHC per-
formance during the Crisis and negatively associated with BHC 
risk taking.117 
This recent literature on the effects of CEO debt holdings 
nicely frames the potential benefits from including publicly traded 
subordinated debt in bankers’ pay packages and personal portfo-
lios.  Inside debt seems a natural corrective for the unique moral 
hazard and risk taking inducements for bankers that derive from 
high leverage, equity incentives, and deposit insurance.  Subordi-
nating the debt and having it trade publicly assure that market ac-
tors will continually assess banks’ default risk and price the debt 
accordingly, and bankers will see the real-time results of this con-
tinuing referendum on their risk taking in the value of their per-
sonal portfolios. 
 
B. Market Discipline through Public Subordinated Debt 
Subordinated debt securities improve on executive pensions 
and deferred compensation as an incentive device because sub-debt 
imposes market discipline.  An issue of subordinated debt—junior 
to depositor liabilities—may impose market discipline on the issu-
ing bank in at least two ways.118   First, debt holders will contract 
with the issuing bank for covenants that constrain the bank’s risk 
taking, and debt holders are typically sophisticated institutional 
investors with the resources and expertise to monitor their borrow-
ers.  Second, the trading price of the subordinated debt is sensitive 
to the bank’s risk taking.  Unlike insured depositors, sub-debt 
                                                 
117 Tung and Wang, supra note 9. 
118 The idea of requiring banks to issue public debt securities in order to impose market disci-
pline on bank risk taking has been the subject of study for several decades.  A 1986 study commis-
sioned by the American Bankers Association recommended a mandatory requirement that banks 
issue subordinated debt.  Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), a large FDIC member bank 
wishing to control a financial subsidiary must have an issue of highly rated debt outstanding.  [cite].  
GLB also commissioned the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department to study the feasi-
bility of requiring large banks and bank holding companies to issue subordinated debt as a device to 
improve market discipline.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 108.  See also Paul Kupiec, Using a Manda-
tory Subordinated Debt Issuance Requirement to Set Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank 
Credit Risks, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL:  BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 146 
(Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (proposing a mandatory subordinated debt requirement). 
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holders do not enjoy federal insurance against losses or repayment 
priority when a bank fails.  Subordinated debt holders are repaid 
only after all depositors—including uninsured depositors—and 
general creditors are repaid in full.119  In the face of real trouble, 
debt holders may either act to enforce their covenants—typically a 
very public maneuver—or they may sell.  In either case, informa-
tion is made public.   
The market for subordinated bank debt is well established,120 
and banks engaging in excessively risky strategies will see their 
sub-debt trading prices drop.121  Market pricing therefore serves as 
a transparent and continuing signal of the riskiness of the bank’s 
activities.  Risk-related price fluctuations will directly affect bank-
ers’ wealth when the debt is included in their personal portfolios.  
In this way, the fine reflection of managerial risk taking generates 
both important incentive and information effects.  It will incentiv-
ize bank officers to monitor risk carefully; it will also offer a clear 
signal to regulators and market participants to give special scrutiny 
to particular banks.122 
Current banking law recognizes that bank subordinated debt 
may help harness private market risk assessment to complement 
regulators’ efforts.  For example, the largest FDIC member banks 
are required to issue long-term investment grade unsecured debt if 
they control a financial subsidiary.123  Market discipline, in the 
form of both market pricing and creditor enforcement actions, 
helps to curb regulatory forbearance problems.  Current regulatory 
                                                 
119 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A). 
120 See infra note 130 and accompanying text; Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex 
Banking Organizations:  Adapting to Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 97, 103, supra note 28. 
121 Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu, Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated 
Debenture Yields:  1983-1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347 (1996) (demonstrating that bond yields reflect inves-
tors’ pricing of bank risk taking); Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordinated Debt to 
Monitor Bank Holding Companies:  Is it Feasible?, 20 J. FIN. SVCS. RES. 147 (2001) (finding that 
bonds of highest liquidity offer the most consistent pricing information for purposes of reflecting 
bank default risk); Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk 
Measures, 20 J. FIN. SVC. RES. 121 (2001) (same). 
122 Some evidence suggests that subordinated debt does influence managers’ decision making.  
Kose John, Hamid Mehran, & Yiming Qian, Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the 
Banking Industry (Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=497922 (finding a statistically 
significant relation between the degree of subordinated debt holder monitoring and pay-performance 
sensitivity).  Cf. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. 
Bank Holding Companies:  Monitoring versus Influencing, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 107, supra 
note 28 (finding evidence of monitoring but finding inconclusive results regarding influence). 
123 William W. Lang & Douglas D. Robertson, Analysis of Proposals for a Minimum Subordi-
nated Debt Requirement, 54 J. ECON. & BUS. 115, 116 (2002). 
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oversight depends heavily on administrative judgments and not on 
market assessments.  Regulatory capital rules are based on ac-
counting rules and administrative assessments of risk.  Similarly, 
bank portfolio supervision turns largely on the administrative dis-
cretion of particular bank supervisors.  Regulators may generally 
be reluctant to act against insolvent banks, either because of politi-
cal pressure from supporters of a shaky bank, or because public 
action may expose regulators’ past mistakes or lax oversight.  Un-
der these conditions, regulators might rather wait and see, hoping 
the shaky bank will work its own way out of trouble.124  Strong 
public indicators of potential default risk, however, may prod regu-
lators into action, as their failure to acknowledge a problem be-
comes more difficult to justify.125 
Subordinated debt also improves on equity both as a form of 
bank capital and as a device for market discipline.  As bank capital, 
sub-debt cushions the bank from losses without the perverse incen-
tives that come with equity.126  Distress-related asset substitution, 
which may include potentially high-yielding but negative expected 
value bets, may be bad for the bank but perhaps still good for eq-
uity holders.  This sort of high-risk gamble is less a problem with 
subordinated debt than with equity.  Because sub-debt enjoys only 
limited upside, subordinated debt holders will not see the same 
benefit from risky strategies that equity holders do.127  So sub-debt 
will be less willing than equity to sacrifice firm value on high-risk 
strategies to return the firm to solvency.  For these same reasons, 
market pricing of subordinated debt is more sensitive to downside 
risk taking than equity, which makes it a superior device for mar-
ket discipline.128  Including sub-debt in bankers’ pay and portfolios 
reinforces these advantages of subordinated debt relative to eq-
uity.129 
                                                 
124 George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, FDICIA After Five Years, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 
139, 141-42 (describing regulatory forbearance problems among U.S. bank regulators). 
125 Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish 
Credible Discipline?  The Case of Argentina, 1992-99, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 147, supra note 
28.  
126 Paul Hamalainen, Mandatory Subordinated Debt and the Corporate Governance of Banks, 
12 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93, 96 (2004). 
127 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  In addition, sub-debt has value even when the 
firm is insolvent, while equity has nothing left to lose. 
128 Id. 
129 An overarching caveat deserves mention.  The implicit (or explicit) promise of a govern-
ment bailout would frustrate attempts at imposing market discipline on banks and their managers.  
(continued next page) 
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C. Features 
This section discusses the important features for publicly 
traded subordinated debt to be used for banker compensation.  The 
features are intended to enhance market discipline on banks, which 
will also incentivize bankers to avoid excessive risk once their 
compensation arrangements and personal wealth include such debt 
securities.  The largest banks already issue subordinated debt,130 so 
feasibility is not an issue.131  These banks will be the most impor-
tant for purposes of cabining systemic risk, and they are the ones 
mostly likely to significantly affect the deposit insurance fund. 
Bank subordinated debt should have a maturity of at least eight 
to ten years.132  The debt should be issued relatively frequently in 
staggered tranches,133 with bankers receiving debt from each issue.  
                                                                                                             
To the extent that debt holders believe that the government will not allow a given financial institu-
tion to fail, its debt holders will price their debt securities accordingly and will have weaker monitor-
ing incentives.  Flannery & Sorescu, supra note 121, at 1374 (finding that bond markets price bank 
default risk more carefully as the likelihood of a government rescue decreases). One possible way of 
addressing this species of moral hazard is explicitly to exclude debt holders by statute as beneficiar-
ies of any future government rescue effort.  Evanoff & Wall 2001. 
130 At the end of 1998, 45 of the 50 largest commercial banks and 48 of the largest 50 bank 
holding companies had issued subordinated debt.  Lang & Robertson, supra note 123, at 124.  See 
also id., tbls. 3, 4 (breaking down by size the number of banks and bank holding companies that had 
subordinated debt issues outstanding at the end of 1998). 
131 The fine tailoring of the terms of the subordinated debt for purposes of market discipline 
may be tricky, however, since the terms of sub-debt issuance are currently driven primarily by bank 
capital guidelines, which are not focused primarily on the market disciplining role of subordinated 
debt.  Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated Debt as Bank Capital:  A Proposal for 
Regulatory Reform, 40 FRB CHI. ECON. PERSP. 40, 43-44. 
132 Commentators interested in the market disciplining effects of bank subordinated debt typi-
cally recommend at least a five-year maturity.  Keehn (1989); Evanoff & Wall; Lang & Robertson, 
supra note 123, at 131; SFRC. 
133 Keehn 1989, Evanoff & Wall, supra note 131, at 36 (recommending two issues per year); 
SFRC. The proceeds of each issuance would be used to retire some portion of outstanding subordi-
nated debt.  For example, a bank might issue $100 million worth of 8-year bonds every six months.  
By the end of year eight, the bank would have $1.6 billion of subordinated debt outstanding, with 
$100 million maturing every six months.  The proceeds of each new issuance would be used to repay 
the maturing tranche of debt. 
 In terms of the total amount of sub-debt outstanding, several studies recommend two percent of 
risk-weighted assets as a suitable minimum.  SFRC; Hamalainen, supra note 126, at 101.  Without 
accounting for risk weighting, it appears that large banks have somewhere in the neighborhood of 
two percent outstanding in the absence of any mandate. For example, as of September 30, 2009, 
JPMorgan Chase Bank had assets of about $1.7 trillion and outstanding subordinated notes and 
debentures of about $28.5 billion, which amounts to just under 1.7% of assets.  Consolidated Reports 
of Condition and Income for A Bank With Domestic and Foreign Offices (FFIEC 031), JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, National Association, as of September 30, 2009, available at 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx.  Similarly, as of September 30, 2009, Bank of 
America, NA had assets of $1.46 trillion and subordinated notes and debentures outstanding of $25 
billion, which represents 1.7% of assets. Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for A Bank 
(continued next page) 
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Bankers should be required to hold the debt for at least half its ma-
turity. This structure should offer continuing incentives for bankers 
to constrain risk taking at their banks.   
The medium- to long term of the debt gives public debt holders 
the appropriate incentive to take the long view—to police bank risk 
to assure long-range stability and to price the debt accordingly.134  
Bankers holding the debt would have a similar perspective.  Hold-
ing debt from each periodic issuance and being required to hold the 
debt for at least half its maturity means that a banker will always 
be holding a significant portfolio of medium-term debt.  
Issuing new debt periodically forces the bank continually to re-
turn to the public capital markets for refinancing, subjecting the 
bank to frequent active monitoring by underwriters, investors, and 
rating agencies.135  So in addition to the medium- to long-term fo-
cus driven by the maturity of the bonds, bank managers have in-
centives toward continual short-term vigilance in order to keep 
their borrowing costs low.  A bank that takes on excessive risk will 
pay a higher interest spread when it goes to sell subordinated debt 
in the public bond markets.136  At the limit, a shaky bank may be 
unable to issue new debt at any price,137 which sends a fairly clear 
market signal that the bank is in trouble.  In effect, frequent issu-
ance of subordinated debt marshals the capital markets to help 
keep bankers on a short leash.138 
The holding requirement, coupled with the banker’s opportu-
nity to sell a portion of her subordinated debt holdings into the 
                                                                                                             
With Domestic and Foreign Offices (FFIEC 031), Bank of America, NA, as of September 30, 2009, 
available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx.  In addition, this amount gives 
some assurance of continuing secondary market liquidity, which is important for high quality price 
signals.  Hancock & Kwast, supra note 121 (noting that issue size, the age of issue, whether the 
issuer is classified as a large complex banking organization, and overall bond market liquidity all 
improve the liquidity of bank subordinated debt). 
134 The bank’s ability to retire debt through buybacks or call options should be limited under 
the terms of the bond indenture.  
135 See Rene M. Stulz, Does Financial Structure Matter for Economic Growth?  A Corporate 
Finance Perspective, Ohio State University Working Paper (2000). 
136 A bank executive might possibly try to engineer a higher interest rate on the next periodic 
debt issuance by increasing bank risk.  However, the size of the banker’s existing debt holdings 
would deter such a strategy because the market would bid down the value of those existing holdings 
in the face of the increased risk.  Structured properly, the executive would lose more on the value of 
her existing holdings than she would gain in terms of the higher interest rate on the new issue.  I am 
indebted to Chuck Whitehead for pointing out this potential for gaming. 
137 Cf. Calomiris & Powell, supra note 125 (describing working of subordinated debt require-
ment in Argentina and inability of weaker banks to accomplish new issuance). 
138 Cf. Berlin (2006) (explaining lenders’ use of short-maturity debt to keep risky firms on a 
short leash). 
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public markets at the end of the holding period, would complement 
the twin goals of the bank’s rolling debt issuance.  Holding the 
bank’s medium term debt would encourage managers to adopt a 
medium- to long-term perspective in their decision making, and the 
periodic receipt of bonds from new debt issues and the regular op-
portunity to sell would encourage managers’ continuing vigilance 
regarding risk taking at the bank.  In general, managers would be 
concerned about maintaining and increasing the trading price of 
the sub-debt, which would discourage excessive risk taking. 
 
D. Bank-Level Debt to Counter Corporate Structure Effects 
The modern bank holding company structure, with banks held 
as wholly owned subsidiaries of diversified financial institutions, 
shows additional sources of risk to banks.  It also informs the 
structuring of our public subordinated debt requirement: the debt 
should be issued at the level of the banking subsidiary, and not the 
BHC.  Public bank debt offers a much crisper market price signal 
regarding risk taking at the bank than would BHC debt or other 
BHC securities.  Bank debt pricing therefore better tracks regula-
tors’ interest in bank safety and soundness and offers better incen-
tives for bankers holding the debt.139  
The BHC structure also complicates the task of identifying the 
bankers to be targeted with pay regulation.  Management structures 
within BHCs will vary.  The CEO and other top officers of a bank-
ing subsidiary should clearly be covered by my proposed pay con-
straints.  Holding company officers may need to be covered as 
well.  Holding company officers will typically have significant in-
fluence over policy decisions at banking subsidiaries, and may 
even be officers of the banking subsidiaries.140  For example, Ken 
Lewis, the CEO, Chairman and President of Bank of America Cor-
poration, the nation’s largest BHC, serves in these same capacities 
for Bank of America, N.A., its principal banking subsidiary and the 
                                                 
139 This is not to suggest that paying bankers with BHC debt or other securities would not be 
potentially useful in curbing BHC risk taking.  But BHC risk is a different problem from the bank 
moral hazard and risk taking that comes with deposit insurance, which is the subject of both my 
proposal and competing proposals. 
140 Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt:  A Capital Markets Ap-
proach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 256 n.202 (noting that bank managers are also 
often managers of the bank holding company).   
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nation’s second-largest bank.141  When BHC officers wield impor-
tant influence over a banking subsidiary’s policy decisions, they 
should be made to hold subordinated debt of that bank.142  
This Section considers the effects of BHC structure on banker 
pay, the attendant incentives to take risk at the bank, and the use of 
bank-level subordinated debt as an antidote.  
 
1. Noisy Proxies and Market Discipline  
In terms of providing market discipline on banks and bankers, 
publicly traded BHC debt or other securities might provide only 
weak discipline compared to debt issued at the bank subsidiary 
level.  The trading price of BHC securities might only offer a noisy 
proxy for risk taking at its banking subsidiary because the BHC 
owns other financial institutions besides just the bank.  Take Bank 
of America, depicted in Figure 2, as an example.  As with most of 
the largest commercial banks, it is the dominant financial institu-
tion within its holding company group, Bank of America Corpora-
tion (BAC).  The bank represents 65% of BAC’s total assets.143  
                                                 
141 Bank of America Corporation 2009 Proxy Statement 16. 
142 Even if the bank and BHC share no common officers, the bank officers serve at the pleasure 
of BHC management, since the BHC controls its banking subsidiaries through its equity ownership.  
So the influence of BHC management is likely to be felt keenly at the bank subsidiary level in any 
event. 
143 Bank of America Corporation Report FR Y-9C Schedule HC Consolidated Balance Sheet, 
as of September 30, 2009 (showing total BHC assets of $2.25 trillion); Bank of America, NA 
Schedule RC Balance Sheet (showing bank asset of $1.46 trillion).  
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
But because BAC holds $790 billion in assets besides its main 
bank, the trading price of BAC’s securities reflect only a compos-
ite of information about the bank and the many additional entities 
comprising the other 35% of BAC’s assets.  By contrast, the trad-
ing price of debt issued by the banking subsidiary would offer a 
more direct signal regarding risk taking at the bank.  Bankers hold-
ing the bank’s public debt would therefore have much greater in-
centive to focus on the bank’s risk taking than if they held BAC 
securities.144  
 
2. BHC Equity Incentives 
Related to this parent-subsidiary issue, banking subsidiary debt 
compensation would respond directly to potentially excessive risk 
                                                 
144 The noisiness of the signal offered by BHC debt with respect to risk taking at the bank de-
pends of course on the proportion of BHC assets represented by the bank.  With a higher proportion, 
the noise problem abates.  Similar issues arise with the use of other BHC securities for banker pay, 
as would occur with the approaches of Bhagat and Romano and Bebchuk and Spamann.  See infra 
Part V. 
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taking incentives created by the typical practice of incentivizing 
bankers with BHC equity-based pay. 
BHC executives set the direction for the entire organization, 
including the BHC’s banking subsidiaries.  Performance incentives 
for these executives typically take the form of BHC common stock 
and options,145 and not the equity of the banks themselves, which 
is not typically publicly traded.146  From the perspective of regulat-
ing risk taking at the bank, paying executives with BHC stock is 
problematic because it encourages bankers to take risks at the bank 
in order to benefit the BHC.  This problem manifests in at least two 
important ways:  layered leverage and affiliate conflicts.   
Layered Leverage.  The BHC structure creates at least two lay-
ers of leverage that affect banks.  Unlike bank equity, which is jun-
ior in payout only to the bank’s creditors, holding company equity 
is junior in payout to both the holding company’s debt and the 
bank’s debt.147  Assume for simplicity’s sake that the BHC’s only 
asset is its equity ownership in its subsidiary bank.  Even if the 
bank has a positive net worth—that is, the value of its assets ex-
ceeds its liabilities and thus its equity has value—BHC sharehold-
ers benefit from that value only if it also exceeds the amount of the 
BHC’s debt.  Otherwise, the value of the bank equity goes to sat-
isfy BHC creditors.  Shareholders of this simplified BHC benefit 
only when the value of the bank’s assets exceeds the amount of the 
bank’s liabilities plus the amount of the holding company’s liabili-
ties.  Therefore, positive but low returns from low-risk bets by the 
bank may be good for the bank but not for holding company equity 
holders.  For them, only high risk-high return bets will be attrac-
tive.  For bankers incentivized with BHC equity securities, their 
risk taking propensities are magnified by the outstanding debt at 
both levels.148 
Related to this layered leverage, risk taking by a BHC or its 
other subsidiaries can affect the risk preferences at the bank.  Risky 
                                                 
145 As earlier noted, these incentives are supplied not just through annual compensation but also 
existing equity holdings, which typically dwarf the value of annual compensation.  See supra note 79 
and accompanying text. 
146 Banks wholly owned by BHCs generally do not issue publicly traded common stock, so 
BHC stock is the only common equity security available. 
147 Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 175, at 14. 
148 Besides taking risky bets, bankers will also forego the positive but low returns from less 
risky bets.  This is the problem of leverage-induced underinvestment.  See Stewart C. Myers, 
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).  
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bets by the bank’s affiliates (or the bank itself) that reduce the 
value of holding company equity effectively increase holding 
company leverage, which as earlier noted increases risk taking in-
centives at the holding company.  This greater propensity for risk 
may cause greater risk taking at the banking subsidiary as well, 
since one layer of the layered leverage faced by bank managers is 
now thicker.149  The situation is even worse with BHC equity op-
tions, which offer a large upside but unlike equity, have very little 
downside.150 
This effect may be especially pernicious in a systemic crisis.  
As bankers’ BHC stock and option holdings lose value, leverage is 
effectively increased, exacerbating moral hazard throughout the 
banking industry.  Bankers and other BHC shareholders have little 
to lose at that point and much to gain from high-risk, potentially 
high-return projects.151   
Affiliate Conflicts.  Independent of layered leverage effects, 
bankers with large BHC equity stakes may be willing to risk bank 
value in order to benefit the holding company—and themselves as 
BHC equity holders.  For example, holding company management 
might force the major banking subsidiary within the BHC (say, 
BankCo N.A.) to extend a risky loan to an unaffiliated firm (say, 
Shaky Debtor, Inc.) that owes significant sums to an affiliate 
within the BHC (say, BankCo Commercial Credit) in order to im-
prove the prospects that Shaky Debtor will be able to repay its loan 
to BankCo Commercial Credit.  BankCo N.A. might not have ex-
tended the risky loan without the intercession of BHC manage-
ment, or might have charged a much higher interest rate to account 
for the risk involved with the loan.  Nevertheless, this loan might 
make sense from the BHC’s perspective.  Overall holding com-
pany value could be enhanced at the bank’s expense, increasing the 
risk of bank failure.152   
The magnitude of this potential conflict between the bank and 
BHC interests will depend on the proportion of BHC value that a 
given bank represents.  As mentioned earlier, each of the largest 
                                                 
149 Id. at 15.   
150 Walker, supra note 96. 
151 Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 175, at 25. 
152 Banking regulations curb the most egregious of these problems, such as sweetheart loans for 
affiliates.  However, investment decisions are notoriously difficult to police for these types of con-
flicts. 
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banks is typically the dominant financial institution within its 
BHC, representing the lion’s share of the BHC’s revenues, profits, 
and assets.  For example, JPMorgan Chase Bank, the nation’s larg-
est commercial bank, represents over 80% of the total assets of its 
BHC.153  Any misalignment of the interests of the BHC and its 
dominant banking subsidiary is therefore likely to be relatively 
small.  The conflict may be greater at Bank of America N.A., 
which as previously noted represents only 65% of total assets 
within Bank of America Corporation. 
More generally, as the economic significance of a bank within 
its BHC decreases, the BHC’s interests are more likely to diverge 
from those of the bank, making BHC equity compensation for 
bank managers increasingly problematic from the standpoint of 
bank safety and soundness.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
offer extreme examples.  Long-time investment banks, these firms 
converted to bank holding companies in the midst of the Financial 
Crisis, a move that gives them permanent access to the Federal Re-
serve’s lending facilities.154  Unlike traditional commercial bank-
ing organizations, the commercial banking operations of these two 
newly minted BHCs account for only a small portion of their busi-
ness activities.  For example, though Morgan Stanley is the na-
tion’s sixth largest bank holding company, its one commercial 
bank—though among the thirty largest commercial banks—
represents less than 8.5% of the holding company’s total assets.155  
Managers incentivized with holding company equity may be in-
                                                 
153 JPMorgan Chase & Co. Report FR Y-9C Schedule HC Consolidated Balance Sheet, as of 
September 30, 2009 (showing total BHC assets of $2.04 trillion); JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association Schedule RC Balance Sheet (showing bank assets of $1.7 trillion). 
154 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bijaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an 
Era, N.Y. TIMES, September 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html.  
155 Morgan Stanley, Report FR Y-9C Schedule HC Consolidated Balance Sheet, as of Septem-
ber 30, 2009 (showing total BHC assets of $770 billion); Morgan Stanley Bank, National Associa-
tion, Schedule RC Balance Sheet, as of September 30, 2009 (showing bank asset of $65 billion).  As 
for Goldman Sachs Group, the nation’s fifth largest BHC, banking assets make up only 13% of its 
total assets.  The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Report FR Y-9C Schedule HC Consolidated Balance 
Sheet, as of September 30, 2009 (showing total BHC assets of $883 billion); Goldman Sachs Bank 
USA, Schedule RC Balance sheet, as of September 30, 2009 (showing bank assets of $115 billion). 
Finally, there is MetLife, traditionally a life insurance company, which is the seventh largest U.S. 
bank holding company.  Its banking assets make up only 2.4% of BHC assets.  Metlife, Inc. Report 
FR Y-9C Schedule HC Consolidated Balance Sheet, as of September 30, 2009 (showing total BHC 
assets of $535 billion); Metlife Bank, National Association, Schedule RC Balance Sheet, as of Sep-
tember 30, 2009 (showing bank asset of $13 billion). 
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clined to put the bank at risk in order to benefit the holding com-
pany and other affiliates.156 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
Granted that regulatory supervision extends to BHCs and their 
non-bank activities,157 and affiliate transactions attract special scru-
tiny.158  However, regulatory oversight may be inconsistent or un-
reliable, and it may be difficult to police the myriad business 
strategies that banks might undertake to benefit their nonbank af-
filiates.  Especially given that BHCs’ non-bank activities are risk-
ier than banking and therefore potentially more profitable, BHC 
equity incentives may encourage bank risk taking to boost these 
potentially more profitable activities.   
                                                 
156 This inclination may explain why large banking subsidiaries do not issue publicly traded 
stock.  The presence of minority shareholders would impede BHC efforts to exploit synergies across 
subsidiaries because putting the bank at risk to benefit its affiliates within the BHC group might 
attract charges of self-dealing and lawsuits by the minority.  Evanoff & Wall, supra note 121, at 125. 
157 For example, BHCs are subject to risk-based supervision and must comply with capital ade-
quacy rules.   
158 Federal Reserve Act, §§ 23A (requiring that all covered transactions between a bank and its 
affiliates be consistent with safe and sound banking practices), 23B (requiring that certain transac-
tions with an affiliate be on market terms); Regulation W, 12 C.F.R. §§ 223.22 et seq. (implementing 
Sections 23A and 23B).  
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* * * 
 
Banker pay in the form of subordinated debt issued at the bank 
level would directly counter the BHC-equity-fueled gambler’s in-
centive to bet the bank.  Whether to overcome layered leverage or 
to enhance the value of affiliates within the BHC, either strategy 
comes at the bank’s expense, and bank sub-debt may be a well-
matched antidote.  
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V. COMPARING OTHER APPROACHES 
In addition to my own proposal, two important academic pro-
posals have recently emerged to restructure bank executive com-
pensation in the service of financial regulation, one from Sanjai 
Bhagat and Roberta Romano, and another from Lucian Bebchuk 
and Holger Spamann.  This Part discusses these efforts and com-
pares them with my own. 
In addition to issues specific to each approach, both proposals 
suffer from two important shortcomings compared to my sub-debt 
approach.  First, both proposals rely on holding company securities 
as incentive pay.  As earlier discussed, because market pricing of 
BHC securities may offer only a very noisy proxy for risk taking 
and performance at a given banking subsidiary, such securities 
may provide bankers only weak incentives with regard to activities 
at the bank.159  Second, both proposals focus exclusively on the 
structure of annual compensation, ignoring the much more signifi-
cant incentive effects of bankers’ existing portfolios of equity and 
other claims on their banking firms.160  Tailored adjustment of 
bankers’ existing portfolio incentives would be difficult to achieve 
under either of their approaches.  These two issues are better ad-
dressed with subordinated debt issued directly by important bank-
ing subsidiaries.161  
I first consider each proposal on its own merits.  I then com-
pare them with my bank sub-debt approach. 
 
                                                 
159 See supra Part IV.D.  Recall that the target bankers for our incentive compensation include 
the members of the management group with policy authority over the bank.  This will likely include 
the bank CEO and other top bank officers.  It is likely also to include BHC officers, who typically 
have significant influence over banking subsidiaries’ policy.  It is also not uncommon that certain 
BHC officers also hold key officer positions at a banking subsidiary.  See supra notes 140-142 and 
accompanying text. 
 160  A key point in analyzing executive incentives is that an executive’s incentives from stock 
and options are properly measured by portfolio incentives. . . . [O]ne cannot determine 
whether an executive has an appropriate level of incentives by examining newly granted 
restricted stock and options compensation in a given year. 
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives:  
A Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., April 2003, at 30. 
161 Moreover, banking subsidiaries’ debt securities may be periodically rolled over—redeemed 
and reissued—in order to impose continuing capital market discipline on banks and bankers.  See 
supra Part IV.C.  This would be quite difficult to accomplish under either the Bhagat-Romano or 
Bebchuk-Spamann approach. 
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A. Bhagat and Romano: Long-term Restricted Stock 
True to the traditional equity-based focus of incentive compen-
sation, Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano have devised a simple 
yet radical restricted stock proposal.  They argue that all equity-
based compensation should take the form of restricted stock and 
restricted stock options, and the stock could not be sold nor the op-
tions exercised until two to four years after the executive leaves the 
firm.162  According to Bhagat and Romano, the two- to four-year 
post-retirement holding period would give executives appropriate 
intermediate-term incentives.  Two years is sufficiently lengthy a 
period that managers would have little potential to profit from ma-
nipulating earnings or public statements or taking undue risks in 
pursuit of short-term profits during their tenure.  The four-year up-
per limit on the holding period would be sufficient for the effects 
of the executive’s decisions and strategies to be realized.  Their 
proposal is targeted primarily at TARP recipient firms, but they 
note that their argument could be extended to all financial firms 
that enjoy federal deposit insurance.163 
The lengthy holding period is the central feature of the Bhagat-
Romano proposal.  Restricted stock and option compensation is not 
new, but the typical vesting period under these compensation plans 
is three to five years after the grant date,164 and the executive is 
typically required to remain employed by the company at the time 
the stock or options vest.165  By contrast, Bhagat and Romano’s 
proposal would require the executive to have left the firm, and a 
number of years to have elapsed after that, before the executive 
could cash out.  Bhagat and Romano note some of the distortions 
that arise with this compensation structure.  Managers under such 
stringent holding periods will be under-diversified, reducing the 
risk-adjusted expected return of their portfolios.166  Bhagat and 
                                                 
162 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:  Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009). 
163 Id. at 367. 
164 FREDERICK W. COOK & CO. THE 2008 TOP 250:  LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRAC-
TICES FOR EXECUTIVES 17 (2008) (noting that options vest in three years for about half of large U.S. 
companies; options vest in four years for about thirty percent of firms; and options vest in five years 
for about fifteen percent of firms).  
165 Walker, supra note 96, at 11 n.42. 
166 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 162, at 367.  Hedging would be prohibited, as that would de-
feat the incentive effects of the restricted stock compensation.  Id. 
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Romano suggest simply increasing the size of the stock or option 
grant, which would increase the expected return to compensate for 
the under-diversification.167  But that approach is inefficient inso-
far as each additional share of stock or option compensation costs 
the firm more than its value to the executive.168  
Their general concept here has some appeal.  Like subordinated 
debt, equity prices also incorporate a firm’s solvency risk.169  With 
sufficiently long holding periods, equity holdings and equity-based 
incentives might curb managers’ short-term risk taking.  After all, 
managers whose equity-based payday comes after they have re-
signed their executive positions must consider the longer-term ef-
fects of their decisions, and not just quarterly results. 
On the other hand, the delayed gratification inherent in this 
lengthy holding period creates important problems.  First, it weak-
ens any incentive effects.170  Managers facing uncertain payoffs 
many years into the future may be too conservative in their project 
selection or may simply care less about firm performance, espe-
cially given the significant “control gap”—the period after retire-
ment and before their equity payoffs, during which they will have 
no influence over the firm’s performance.171  In addition, the po-
tentially long delay between performance and pay creates a liquid-
ity problem for executives because a large portion of their compen-
sation cannot be spent for years after it is earned.172  Acknowledg-
ing this problem, Bhagat and Romano suggest that the limit on tax 
deductibility of non-performance-based compensation be raised 
from $1 million to $3 million,173 in order to allow for greater cash 
compensation to executives being paid with restricted stock.  This 
                                                 
167 Id. 
168 Walker, supra note 96, at 19 (noting that executives would effectively be receiving more of 
something they value less).  There is the added problem that because current rules on executive 
compensation disclosure require valuation of stock awards at the market price—and would therefore 
not account for executives’ under-diversification discount—the value of these stock awards would 
be overstated, potentially exacerbating public outrage over executive compensation levels.  See id. 
169 This useful effect is qualified by the “noisy proxy” problem that arises from the use of BHC 
securities to compensate bankers, as opposed to securities issued by the bank itself.  See infra Part 
IV.D. 
170 George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal Bargaining:  Implications for 
Rationality, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 825, 830 (2003) (explaining experimental evidence showing that 
“the value of reward is inversely propritional to delay”). 
171 This control gap may increase their incentives to actively participate in the wise choice of 
their successors, but it is not clear whether their current incentives are inadequate. 
172 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 162, at 368. 
173 See I.R.C. § 162(m). 
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alleviates the liquidity problem to some extent.  However, higher 
levels of fixed compensation also blunt the performance incentives 
that drive their proposal.   
In addition, using retirement from the firm as a trigger gives 
good CEOs an incentive to retire too soon.  Bhagat and Romano 
argue that the holding period is not really so onerous, given that 
the median CEO tenure for large U.S. companies is five years.174  
The median, however, may not fully capture the magnitude of the 
premature retirement problem.  For policymaking purposes, the 
variance of CEO tenure also matters.  A wide dispersion may mean 
that a large proportion of CEO’s must wait fifteen or twenty years 
to cash out their earliest-granted restricted stock or options.  Per-
versely, since the best performing CEOs are likely to enjoy the 
longest tenure, they are likely to feel most keenly the constraints of 
the Bhagat-Romano holding period.  The best CEOs may retire 
earlier than is optimal for their firms in order to be able to cash out 
sooner. 
 
B. Bebchuk and Spamann:  Paying by the Slice 
Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann propose that for finan-
cial firms, banker pay should be linked not just to improved share-
holder returns, but to firms’ enterprise value as represented by a 
diversified basket of each firm’s securities.175 Banker pay should 
be tied to the value of a proportionate slice all the BHC’s securi-
ties176—its preferred stock and bonds, as well as common equity—
thereby linking pay to “a larger part of the corporate pie.”177  In-
                                                 
174 They point out that executives facing a seven- to nine-year wait to cash out their earliest-
received stock and option grants would not be unique to financial firms, as general partners of pri-
vate equity firms must often wait seven to ten years to receive the bulk of the carried interest portion 
of their compensation. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 162, at 369. 
175 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, __ GEO. L. J. __ (forth-
coming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410072.   
176 Id. at 39 (proposing that executive pay be tied to “a set percentage of the aggregate value of 
common shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding bonds”).  Though the authors do not explicitly 
distinguish BHC securities from those of banking subsidiaries, their approach only works with hold-
ing company securities, since banking subsidiaries do not issue public equity—their common stock 
is held entirely by their BHC—or preferred stock. 
177 Id.  For example, for TARP firms, because of the government’s large stake in the preferred 
stock of these firms, executive pay should track aggregate returns on a specified percentage of the 
value of all common and preferred shares. This would align managers’ incentives somewhat with 
shareholders’ interests but also somewhat with the public interest in having TARP investments re-
paid.  Id. 
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cluding common and preferred shares and bonds in this basket 
would expose managers to a broader range of downside risks to 
which the firms’ various investors are subject, and would tend to 
deter excessive risk taking.178   
Bebchuk and Spamann’s approach takes important steps in the 
right direction.  Including BHC preferred stock and bonds as part 
of executives’ incentive pay would offer a clear improvement to 
the current common shareholder-focused equity-based approach.  
Because holders of preferred stock and bonds generally prefer less 
risk than common shareholders, inclusion of these securities more 
closely aligns managers’ incentives with those of regulators inter-
ested in safety and soundness and preservation of the FDIC insur-
ance fund.179  
On the other hand, while this approach will generally reduce 
managers’ risk taking proclivities at the BHC level, and has some 
intuitive investor-democratic appeal, it does not precisely respond 
to the original problem, which is not underrepresentation of BHC 
investors but moral hazard at the banking subsidiary and risk ex-
ternalization to the public fisc.  Because bank managers’ individual 
situations will vary in ways that are not correlated with their 
BHCs’ capital structures, there is no conceptual basis for assuming 
that executive pay in the form of a representative slice of the 
BHC’s securities will offer appropriate incentives to internalize 
risk at the banking subsidiary.  Managers’ existing holdings of 
their firm’s securities will vary, for example.180  Because of the 
strong incentive effects of these existing holdings and their varia-
tion across managers,181 paying by the slice may not appropriately 
respond to each individual.  Adherence to strict proportionality 
                                                 
178 Bebchuk and Spamann suggest additional benchmarks to which executive pay might be 
linked in order to curb risk taking.  Perhaps executive pay could be reduced based on the amount of 
any government payments made to support the bank—including deposit insurance payments—
during the one-year period after the executive’s departure from the firm.  Id. at 40.  The authors 
suggest that any expected increase in future government payments could be proxied by multiplying 
the value of the bank’s (presumably insured) deposits by any increase in the implied probability of 
default that may be inferred from the price of credit default swaps.  Id. 
179 Bebchuk and Spamann also argue that bankers’ pay should be regulated, or at least carefully 
monitored, as an important facet of banking regulation generally, independent of the current Crisis 
and the attending government support.  Id. at 34. 
180 Banks’ and BHCs’ growth opportunities will also vary, which affects the optimal level of 
risk taking, though growth opportunities may correlate with capital structure.  Managers’ inside debt 
holdings in the form of pensions and deferred compensation will also vary, and these have been 
shown to affect managers’ risk taking proclivities.  See infra Part IV.A. 
181 See infra Part IV. 
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across classes of the bank’s securities in structuring incentive 
compensation forsakes flexibility that may be useful in tailoring 
compensation to address specific managers’ situations. 
 
C. Comparing 
For purposes of constraining bank risk taking, long-term re-
stricted BHC stock or pay-by-the-BHC-slice compensation may 
offer some improvement over the standard BHC equity approach 
that currently dominates banker pay structures.  However, my bank 
sub-debt approach is superior for its focus on bank risk, its stronger 
market discipline, and its utility in tailoring bankers’ portfolio in-
centives.  
Bank-issued subordinated debt offers a clearer market signal 
concerning risk taking at the bank than long-term BHC equity or a 
slice of BHC securities,182 giving market actors, regulators, and 
bankers better information about default risk and more finely tai-
loring managerial incentives to risk regulatory goals.  This market 
discipline may be enhanced through a program of regular periodic 
issuance of new debt securities, which requires the bank to con-
tinually access public capital markets for fresh capital and subject 
itself to primary market review.183  This periodic market review is 
unworkable for compensation arrangements that rely on long-term 
restricted BHC equity, or that attempt to mirror BHC capital struc-
tures.184   
                                                 
182 Adding more basket components to account for future government payments required to 
support the bank, as Bebchuk and Spamann suggest, further complicates any market pricing signal, 
especially if the component depends on actual future payments, for which no readily available mar-
ket pricing exists.  Even relying on CDS pricing may be problematic, as CDS markets are frag-
mented and opaque.  Subordinated debt markets, by contrast, are likely to be more liquid and trans-
parent for large banks. 
183 Weaker banks may even find themselves unable to float the required issue, an event with se-
rious consequences for the bank, which sends a clear market signal.  Cf. Calomiris & Powell, supra 
note 125 (describing inability of weaker Argentine banks to issue required subordinated debt).  
184 There is no public market for Bhagat and Romano’s long-term restricted BHC stock.  And 
the trading price of the outstanding BHC common stock would not offer a useful metric for valuing 
long-term restricted stock because of the extreme holding period applicable to BHC executives, 
which puts their holdings in a completely different category.  As for Bebchuk and Spamann’s pay-
by-the-slice, BHCs might issue new publicly traded common and preferred shares and debt periodi-
cally.  However, unlike regular bank sub-debt issues, periodic by-the-BHC-slice issuances would be 
difficult to structure as important capital raising events for the BHC because large periodic issues of 
common shares would dilute existing shareholders’ equity holdings.  Nominal issuances, of course, 
would not impose stringent market review. 
In any event, for both long-term restricted BHC stock and by-the-BHC-slice securities, the 
market would be reviewing the financial health of the BHC, and not the soundness of the bank. 
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No approach based solely on BHC securities can directly ad-
dress layered leverage and affiliate conflict problems.185  Overall 
BHC risk taking might be reduced with long-term restricted BHC 
stock or by-the-slice BHC securities for bankers, but that would 
not necessarily incentivize bankers to reduce risk at the bank. 
Pay-by-the-BHC-slice does better than long-term restricted 
stock for addressing layered leverage, since the BHC debt securi-
ties would have value even if the BHC were insolvent.186  Pay-by-
the slice might therefore reduce bankers’ incentives to gamble in 
high leverage or distress situations as compared with standard 
BHC equity compensation.  Again, however, because bankers 
holding BHC securities would be concerned primarily with BHC 
value, affiliate conflicts would remain problematic.  Bankers might 
still bet the bank to save the BHC. 
Subordinated bank debt offers superior incentives along these 
margins compared to long-term BHC equity or BHC securities by 
the slice.  Subordinated debt compensation more directly reduces 
the layered leverage incentives from BHC equity because bankers 
would have a direct stake in the value of debt at the bank level.  
Affiliate conflicts would also be much more aggressively amelio-
rated because sacrificing the bank to benefit BHC equity would 
have a direct negative impact on bankers’ personal bank sub-debt 
holdings. 
Sub-debt compensation can also directly manage bankers’ port-
folio incentives.  Annual adjustments to bankers’ pay could ac-
count for changes in the composition of bankers’ personal portfo-
lios and changes in banks’ risk profiles.  By contrast, neither long-
term restricted BHC stock compensation nor pay-by-the-BHC-slice 
can offer this sort of fine tuning of portfolio incentives.187  Again, 
                                                 
185 See supra Part IV.D.2. 
186 Long-term restricted BHC stock might temper bet-the-bank strategies for improving BHC 
value to some extent.  Bankers’ long time horizon might discourage them from extreme short-term 
risky strategies.  However, bankers holding even long-term restricted BHC stock care primarily 
about BHC returns.  Facing distress-induced high BHC leverage, for example, bankers might reason 
that the long run may never arrive if the BHC fails.  So short run gambles for BHC solvency may 
still be attractive, even if they require sacrificing the bank. 
187 As earlier noted, Kenneth Feinberg, the special master overseeing compensation at the larg-
est seven TARP recipient companies, has slashed salaries in favor of long-term stock grants, which 
will vest over four years.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  While this approach may re-
spond to popular outrage over executive pay, its superficial popular appeal does not offer a long-
term solution to executive risk taking.  Though annual compensation is easy to observe, for execu-
tives with even a few years’ tenure, annual pay is almost certainly dwarfed by the value of the ex-
ecutives’ pre-existing portfolios of their banks’ securities.  Even if every annual stock grant carries a 
(continued next page) 
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any portfolio of BHC securities may offer only coarse incentives 
with respect to risk taking at the bank, and may even increase bank 
risk taking in some circumstances. 
                                                                                                             
four-year vesting period, in a short time the value of an executive’s unrestricted stock will exceed 
that of her restricted stock, so short-term incentives may outweigh longer-term concerns. 
Lengthening the holding period, of course, runs into greater liquidity, diversification, and de-
layed gratification problems discussed in the context of the Bhagat-Romano proposal. 
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
The regulation of bankers’ pay should not be viewed as a sub-
stitute for existing banking regulation, but as an integral part of the 
regulatory structure.188  With an additional tool to encourage 
banker prudence, regulators may be able to more finely balance the 
competing concerns of risk regulation and bank profitability.  For 
example, better prudential incentives in executive pay arrange-
ments may justify lower deposit insurance premiums, less stringent 
capital requirements, or less burdensome reporting requirements or 
on-site examinations for a given bank. 
This Part discusses two important implementation issues:  how 
to go about setting substantive targets for bankers’ inside debt port-
folios and how to instigate banks to use bank sub-debt compensa-
tion in pursuit of banker portfolio management.  Given the com-
plexity of large banks and BHCs, the attendant complexity of 
banking regulation, and the novelty of using banker pay as an in-
strument of risk regulation, much will have to be learned through 
experience.  This Part sketches some key considerations moving 
forward.  
 
A. Setting Debt-Equity Targets 
Calibrating the optimal debt-equity targets for bankers’ pay and 
portfolios might be tricky and will depend on bank-specific fac-
tors,189 as well as the corporate structure effects discussed 
above.190  For example, the amount of bank-level subordinated 
debt in a banker’s portfolio should be calibrated to counter the in-
centive effects of her BHC equity holdings and layered leverage on 
risk taking at the bank. Greater layered leverage will require 
                                                 
188 As John, Saunders and Senbet note, bank regulation that accounts for the incentives of top 
management will be more effective.  John, Saunders, & Senbet, supra note 15. 
189 The inside debt literature identifies a number of factors:  leverage, capital structure, invest-
ment opportunities, ownership structure, and default risk. See Edmans, supra note 98, at 3 (noting 
that the optimal amount of debt increases with leverage, the probability of default, and managers’ 
ability to affect liquidation values; and decreases with growth opportunities); John, Saunders, & 
Senbet, supra note 15, at 96 (noting that bank managers’ risk-shifting incentives depend crucially on 
the characteristics of the bank’s investment opportunities); Bagnani, et al., supra note 50 (finding 
that the effects of equity-based pay on managers’ risk taking is not monotonic). 
190 See supra Part IV.D.  
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greater bank sub-debt holdings as a counterweight to the risk in-
ducing incentives of leverage.191  A consideration of the size and 
economic importance of the bank relative to the BHC’s other sub-
sidiaries will also be important.  If the bank is the dominant sub-
sidiary in the BHC, as is the case with JPMorgan Chase Bank,192 
affiliate conflicts are less of a concern.193  By contrast, when the 
bank is less important economically to the BHC as a whole, such 
as Morgan Stanley Bank,194 more bank sub-debt holdings should 
be required of the relevant bankers.  Greater bank sub-debt hold-
ings will help bankers resist the temptation to take risky bets at the 
bank to benefit affiliates, since greater risk at the bank will result 
in a negative price reaction in the public debt market and a reduc-
tion in the value of bankers’ bank sub-debt holdings. 
In addition, the existing personal asset portfolios of individual 
bankers will affect the structure of the optimal compensation con-
tract.  As already noted, inside debt in the form of pensions and 
deferred compensation have important effects on managerial risk 
taking,195 and these debt holdings should also be taken into ac-
count.196  With these various considerations, bankers’ personal 
debt-equity ratios can be adjusted to maintain appropriate risk tak-
ing incentives in the face of new conditions affecting the bank or 
market price movements that might otherwise skew the weighting 
of bankers’ portfolios. 
 
B. Implementation Incentives 
Because of each bank’s unique situation and the fine judgments 
required to optimize compensation arrangements, strict regulatory 
mandates seem inadvisable.  Generalized mandates are likely to 
offer a poor fit for many banks, and mandates may be difficult to 
revise in the face of changed circumstances.  
                                                 
191 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
193 BHC equity incentives will still need to be addressed, of course. 
194 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra Part IV.A. 
196 Bankers’ pensions and deferred compensation are likely to be obligations of their holding 
companies, and not the banking subsidiaries.  Therefore, the effects of this inside BHC debt on risk 
taking at the banks are likely to be indirect, dependent on the corporate structure of the BHC.  See 
supra Part IV.D. 
2010] PAY FOR BANKER PERFORMANCE 51 
DRAFT JULY 22, 2010 
Instead, banking regulators could offer guidelines and regula-
tory incentives to encourage appropriate amounts of subordinated 
debt in bankers’ pay arrangements, while at the same time preserv-
ing the discretion of boards of directors to set pay.  For example, 
executive pay structures could be included as a factor in the setting 
of deposit insurance premiums.197  The current deposit insurance 
pricing scheme requires the FDIC to grade each bank, based on its 
capital ratios and other information, and assign it to one of four 
risk categories.  Within each category, pricing is then determined 
based on additional bank-specific factors.198  The FDIC could simi-
larly grade executive compensation, relying on a handful of grades 
to differentiate compensation schemes from a prudential regulatory 
perspective.199  Grading could reflect, among other things, the 
debt-equity composition of executives’ pay packages and personal 
portfolios and the specific features of the component securities, all 
in the context of each bank’s situation.  This grading could then be 
incorporated into insurance pricing.200 
                                                 
197 John, Saunders, & Senbet, supra note 15 (proposing that risk-based pricing of deposit insur-
ance should incorporate features of bank managers’ compensation). 
198 cite 
199 Even before the Financial Crisis, bank executives’ compensation was subject to regulatory 
scrutiny to assure that it not be excessive and would not lead to a material financial loss.  See, e.g., 
First Nat’l Bank of Eden v. Comptroller of the Currency, 568 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1978) (affirming an 
order of the Controller of the Currency finding that excessive compensation constituted an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice). 
Section 39(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDI-
CIA) required that bank regulators prescribe standards for executive compensation as part of safety 
and soundness regulation.  12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(c)(1)(a).  Interagency guidelines on the matter fol-
lowed.  Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness, 12 C.F.R. 364.100 
App. A.  However, the guidelines on executive compensation added little to the statutory language.  
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Refocusing Regulatory Limitations on Banks’ Compensation Practices, 
37 B.C.L. REV. 861, 874 (1996). 
Especially relevant for our inquiry, regulators have scrutinized incentive compensation struc-
tures under this framework, rejecting arrangements that create perverse risk taking incentives. Id. at 
867 & n.63.  See also Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Insider Activities, in COMPTROLLER’S 
HANDBOOK 13, March 2006 (cautioning that banks should prevent the payment of compensation that 
could lead to material financial loss to the bank).  Regulators have also imposed limits on executive 
compensation, including conditions or prohibitions on raises and bonus payments.  Id. at 869.  Regu-
lators have ordered banks to conduct prospective comprehensive reviews of their compensation 
systems, id. at 870; and have even required banks to submit incentive compensation plans for regula-
tors’ approval.  See Westsound Bank, FDIC-08-038b, FDIC Order to Cease and Desist (March 7, 
2008), available at  http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/2008-03-08.pdf.  Regulators 
have taken an especially dim view of the enforceability of executive severance agreements once a 
bank has become insolvent or entered receivership.  Schooner, supra, at 886. Further elaboration of 
guidelines to encourage some form of subordinated debt compensation does not seem a great stretch, 
especially in light of the Financial Crisis and the role that executive compensation has played. 
200 See John, Saunders, & Senbet, supra note 15. 
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Relying on regulators to incorporate banker pay arrangements 
into their discretionary regulatory strategies carries certain risks, of 
course.  In addition to the standard regulatory agency conflicts,201 
risk-based pricing of deposit insurance is not easy to implement as 
a technical matter, especially with respect to the largest banks, be-
cause of the difficulty of quantifying the credit risk in a bank’s 
loan portfolio.202  Perhaps because of this difficulty, risk-based 
pricing has not historically differentiated very finely among banks:  
almost all banks paid the same lowest rate.203  Such a premium 
structure offers only weak incentives for banks to reduce risk.  In 
addition, even if insurance pricing better differentiated among 
banks, for some BHCs, deposit insurance costs might be trivial 
relative to the BHC’s overall activities, so that even high premiums 
would be insufficient to induce socially desirable changes in 
banker pay arrangements.204  More drastic inducements might be 
required, such as adjustment of banks’ capital requirements to ac-
count for executive pay and portfolio structures, which would di-
rectly affect bank risk taking and profitability. 
Though regulatory intervention in this area may be tricky, my 
proposal nevertheless enhances the regulatory tool kit for encour-
aging prudent banking.205  Even an imperfect approach to encour-
                                                 
201 See Frederic S. Mishkin, Evaluating FDICIA, in RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:  PRI-
VATE AND PUBLIC POLICY, v.9 17 (George Kaufman, ed., 1997) (discussing principal-agent prob-
lems in banking regulation).  Regulators may forbear from taking action against a faltering bank, 
either because of political pressure from the bank’s allies or because regulators would rather delay 
exposing their own regulatory failings in the hope that the bank might work its own way out of trou-
ble.  Id. 
202 Id. at 25. 
203 Id. (noting that as of 1997, well over 90% of banks paid the lowest premium rate); George J. 
Benston & George G. Kaufman, FDICIA After Five Years, 11 J. ECON. PERSP., 139, 149 (1997) 
(finding that in 1997, almost all banks qualified for the safest category for insurance premium pur-
poses).  The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 gave the FDIC some greater discretion 
to implement risk-based premium classifications.  George G. Pennacchi, Deposit Insurance (2009) at 
7.  At the time of its adoption, only 45% of banks were being charged the minimum rate.  Id.  As of 
June 30, 2008, only 45% of the safest (Risk Category I) banks were paying the minimum rate.  Fed. 
Reg. 74, no. 41, p. 9528 (March 4, 2009). 
204 This weak deterrence from high deposit insurance premiums applies to risk taking at the 
bank more generally.  As earlier noted, for a bank that represents only a small part of a BHC’s busi-
ness activities, BHC managers may be willing to take risks at the bank to benefit other BHC subsidi-
aries.  See supra Part IV.D.2.  Increased deposit insurance costs might be a trivial consideration.  I 
am indebted to David Walker for raising this point. 
205 An overarching caveat deserves mention.  The implicit (or explicit) promise of a govern-
ment bailout would frustrate attempts at imposing market discipline on banks and their managers, 
even if some combination of regulatory and private action resulted in the implementation of a subor-
dinated debt compensation arrangement as I have proposed.  To the extent that debt holders believe 
that the government will not allow a given financial institution to fail, its debt holders will price their 
debt securities accordingly and will have weaker monitoring incentives.  Flannery & Sorescu, supra 
(continued next page) 
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aging debt compensation offers an improvement over the current 
situation.206 
                                                                                                             
note 121, at 1374 (finding that bond markets price bank default risk more carefully as the likelihood 
of a government rescue decreases). One possible way of addressing this species of moral hazard is 
explicitly to exclude debt holders by statute as beneficiaries of any future government rescue effort. 
Evanoff & Wall 2001. 
206 Moreover, despite these difficulties, the FDIC has begun to consider tying premiums to 
bankers’ compensation arrangements.  Joe Adler, Plan to Link Premiums to Comp Already Under 
Fire, AM. BANKER, January 8, 2010, at 1.  This is surely a step in the right direction.  As part of their 
efforts to reduce systemic risk, bank regulators should monitor executive compensation arrange-
ments and incorporate this scrutiny as part of their supervision function. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
I have proposed a new approach to compensating bankers that 
explicitly incorporates market discipline and a pay-for-
performance strategy to constrain excessive risk taking.  The key 
feature of my approach is to include banks’ subordinated debt se-
curities as part of bankers’ compensation.  In addition, I argue that 
the primary focus for structuring banker pay should be on the 
composition of their personal portfolios of their banks’ securities 
and other claims on their banks.  The current spotlight on annual 
pay alone misses the much stronger influence that managers’ per-
sonal portfolios exert on their risk taking incentives. 
Using bank subordinated debt to adjust bankers’ portfolios 
away from excessively risky strategies has important advantages 
over existing approaches, which ignore portfolio effects and rely 
solely on BHC securities, which may provide only a noisy signal 
of risk taking at BHCs’ banking subsidiaries. 
Important details of this approach will need to be worked out 
through practical experience.  In this time of critical regulatory re-
examination and experimentation, bonding bankers to less risky 
strategies seems a worthy project. 
